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Foreword
‘Voting is an essential part of the 
democratic process. It’s vitally 
important that the electoral process 
is fit for purpose for the twenty-first 
century, and that voting is accessible 
and convenient as could be to all 
citizens. This research-led report 
helpfully sets out the arguments 
and issues to be weighed up as 
policy makers and parliamentarians 
consider whether to introduce 
automatic voter registration.’
 
Andrew Bowie MP,  
Chair of the APPG on Democratic Participation
4  |  Executive Summary
This report draws from academic literature, 
sources including interviews with stakeholders, 
comparative international experiences and 
Freedom of Information requests to outline 
and assess the arguments. It finds that:
•   “Automatic voter registration” (AVR) is the 
direct enrolment of citizens onto the electoral 
register by public officials, without the need 
for pro-active action by citizens. AVR can be 
contrasted with the current system found in 
the UK, in which citizens are responsible for 
registering themselves ahead of the deadline 
for election day.  It can also be distinguished 
from ‘assisted’ voter registration, which 
involves citizens being asked to register 
to vote when accessing other government 
services. AVR is therefore a broad principle 
and umbrella-term that could in practice 
involve a range of different approaches.
•   Some form of direct enrolment is the norm 
in democracies around the world because 
many countries are able to use population 
registers to directly enrol citizens. Many 
parts of democracies in the Anglosphere 
who have not historically had direct 
enrolment such as Australia, Canada and the 
USA, however, have recently implemented 
it for specific under-registered groups such 
as young people or when accessing specific 
government services such as driver licence 
agencies.
•   Electoral registration has seen some major 
modernisation in the UK, following nearly a 
century of continuity. Recent reforms have 
included online voter registration, individual 
electoral registration and annual canvass 
reform. AVR has been proposed in Wales 
following further devolved powers.
Executive Summary
Automatic voter registration (AVR) has been increasingly proposed in the UK by 
parliamentary committees, campaigners, politicians and academics. There are 
millions of citizens incorrectly registered or missing from the electoral register 
entirely. Is it therefore time for AVR to boost voter participation? Or are there 
practical or philosophical problems involved in registering people automatically?
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•   There are many underlying problems with 
the status quo such as millions of eligible 
citizens being incorrectly registered or 
missing from the registers entirely, major 
strains on the system during a last-minute 
registration rush ahead of election day and 
resource problems for electoral officials.
•   The main philosophical argument raised 
against AVR is usually that it should be an 
individual responsibility to register to vote.  
There are also concerns that AVR might 
require a civil population register.
•   The arguments in favour of AVR are primarily 
that voter registration rates are in decline 
and citizens often think that they are already 
registered. AVR could therefore prevent some 
citizens being unable to vote on election day 
or would improve their overall experience. 
Political equality is a founding principle of 
democracy and policies are therefore needed 
to ensure a level playing field on election 
day. AVR could boost voter registration rates 
amongst under-registered groups to create 
this more level playing field.
•   There are multiple options for implementing 
AVR. These include:
 1.  A new centralised civil population 
register. This would be the most direct 
pathway to AVR, but concerns about 
civil liberties may make this approach 
unpopular and it would have much 
broader consequences.
 2.  The expansion of the DWP Customer 
Information System to act as a single 
national electoral register.
 3.  Localised data-mining. AVR could 
be introduced by making datasets 
available to local electoral registration 
officers to identify and register missing 
voters. Past experience has shown 
that this approach is not necessarily 
cost effective and it could be very 
unevenly implemented.
 4.  Direct enrolment for specific groups 
only, such as 16 year olds.
 5.  Assisted voter registration. This would 
involve citizens being prompted to 
register to vote when accessing a 
range of other government services 
such as applying for a driving licence.
This report outlines what AVR is, and 
considers the arguments for and against 
its adoption in the UK. It makes 28 
recommendations to modernise the 
UK’s electoral machinery for an inclusive 
twenty-first century democracy.
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•   The report provides data on the current 
frequency of citizens’ transactions with some 
key government services. It suggests that 
options 4 and 5 (direct enrolment for specific 
groups and assisted voter registration) could 
be the most cost-effective methods that 
would lead to considerable improvements 
in the completeness and accuracy of the 
register. 
•   Directly registering citizens shortly before 
their 16th birthday when they are issued 
their National Insurance Number would add 
700,000 citizens to the roll each year with 
minimal administrative effort. These citizens 
could then be provided accompanying civic 
education lessons while in school. 
•   Providing citizens with an option to register 
to vote/update their registration details when 
accessing other government services would 
enable millions of citizens to register more 
easily. For example: 
 -  6.5 million per year could register when 
applying for a passport
 -  4 million people could register when they 
update their driving licence address with 
the DVLA
 -  2 million a year could register when 
applying for Universal Credit
 -  2.5 million students could be registered 
through annual student enrolment
 -  800,000 could register when they apply 
for child benefit for the first time
 -  500,000 could register when they 
provide the Student Loans Company 
with a new address
 -  450,000 could register when they apply 
for disability benefits
•   Accompanying reforms are also 
recommended to overcome issues with 
privacy and data security.  New direct 
enrolments should not be added to the 
open/edited electoral register (which can be 
bought by anyone) and this register should 
be abolished. Anonymous registration should 
be extended to at least five years and the 
procedures to register anonymously should 
be relaxed to prevent vulnerable adults being 
at risk of harm. There should be tightened 
restrictions on the use of the electoral 
register for non-electoral purposes.
•   Overall, this report makes 28 
recommendations to modernise the UK’s 
electoral machinery for an inclusive twenty-
first century democracy.
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 “Automatic voter registration” 
(AVR) is the direct enrolment of 
citizens onto the electoral register 
by public officials, without the need 
for pro-active action by citizens.
1  The term is used interchangeably with ‘direct enrolment’ and 
‘automatic voter registration’ in this report – to which it is more 
commonly referred to in some countries including Australia. Introduction  |  9
What is ‘Automatic voter registration’? 
1.1  “Automatic voter registration” (AVR) is the 
direct enrolment of citizens onto the electoral 
register by public officials, without the need 
for pro-active action by citizens. AVR can be 
contrasted with the current system found 
in the UK, in which citizens are responsible 
for registering themselves ahead of the 
deadline for election day.1 AVR can also be 
contrasted with assisted voter registration – 
which is defined in this report as a range of 
interventions to prompt citizens to register to 
vote when they interact with other government 
services. 
1.2  AVR has been described as a potential 
gamechanger for democratic politics. In 
an age where many citizens do not vote, 
often because of confusion about voter 
registration, it has been positioned as a 
critical structural problem that could have 
the most impact on the number of citizens 
registered. While voter registration does 
not automatically translate into voter 
participation, there is evidence that citizens 
are often unable to vote because they think 
that automatic registration already exists 
and are turned away on election day.  Being 
on the electoral roll enables citizens to be 
contacted by parties and pressure groups 
encouraging them to participate. It is 
therefore seemingly an important step for 
realising an inclusive electoral process.
1.3  There has been cross party support for 
AVR in the UK from the Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee in its 2014 
report on Voter Engagement (Select Committe 
on Political and Constitutional Reform 2014), 
and the All-Party Parliamentary Group on 
Democratic Participation’s report on the 
Missing Millions (Bite the Ballot, James, and 
ClearView Research 2016). The Electoral 
Commission called for automatic voter 
registration processes in 2017 (Electoral 
Commission 2017b).  
1.4  There have also been important concerns 
raised about the potential impact of 
automatic registration on the long-term 
accuracy of the electoral register, on privacy, 
on data protection and security. These issues 
therefore need detailed consideration if the 
UK is to continue to modernise the electoral 
registration process utilising technology and 
automation – as it increasingly has done since 
the turn of the century.
The Purpose of this Report
1.5  The purpose of this report is to understand 
the potential trade-offs and choices available 
to policy makers, identify safeguards that 
could address concerns and examine how the 
UK could introduce various forms of assisted, 
partially automated or fully automatic 
registration. The research questions that it 
therefore seeks to address are as follows:
 - How does the system currently work?
 -  What are the problems with the existing 
system of electoral registration?
 -  What alternative systems have been used 
overseas? How effective have they proven?
 -  What challenges might there be for 
implementing AVR?
 - How could AVR work in the UK?
1.6  The Electoral Commission has recently 
published a feasibility study, which makes 
considerable inroads into this topic.  
There remain several broader legal and 
organisational issues to be considered. 
The Electoral Commission study focussed 
on whether AVR was feasible in law, but 
not whether the broader legal framework 
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2 Based on James (2020, 59-86) https://tandfbis.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/
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sufficiently protected the rights of citizens. 
This report also draws from a wider set of 
academic and comparative research about 
different voter registration systems.
What does good electoral registration look like?
1.7  Before we begin, it is worth considering what 
a modern electoral registration system should 
look like. Electoral registration should aim to 
have2: 
 •  Complete registers – everyone who 
is eligible to vote should be included. 
This is important to ensure that no one 
is effectively disenfranchised through 
administrative issues.
 •  Accurate registers – all names on the 
electoral register should be accurate and 
eligible electors. 
This is important in 
the prevention of 
electoral fraud.
 •  Cost-efficiency – 
the register must 
be delivered in a 
way that is cost 
efficient. This is 
important because 
public resources are 
always finite and 
excess funds could 
be used elsewhere.
 •  Investment 
sufficiency – 
sufficient funding 
should be made 
available to compile 
the electoral 
register. This is 
important so that no ‘corners are cut’ in the 
delivery of electoral registration.
 •  Citizen convenience – minimal effort 
should be exerted by a citizen to register 
to vote.  This is important because it is an 
attribute of the quality of service but could 
also affect whether citizens register. 
 •  Equity of outcome across society – 
registration and accuracy rates should be 
consistent across the population so that no 
one group is disadvantaged or advantaged.  
This is important because different groups 
could receive unequal representation and 
election results might be affected by a 
‘turnout gap.’
 •  Robust staff capacity – there should not be 
a disproportionate workload burden on staff 
who should be motivated, have the required 
skills and ability, and work in good working 
conditions. This is important for the delivery 
of an election without risks of errors.
 •  Robust service functionality – potential 
vulnerabilities should be identified 
and addressed that could affect the 
deliverability of the election and undermine 
voter confidence. This allows problems to 
be prevented in advance.
1.8  In addition, there are further issues relating 
to data transparency/citizen rights that have 
not always been given due consideration. 
People should be aware of how and when 
their data will be added to the system, 
for example when their interactions with 
government websites might trigger an entry 
or change to the record, 
and have opportunities 
to access and correct that 
data, as well as knowledge 
and understanding of all 
the functions to which the 
registers will be used.
1.9    It is also important 
that citizens are aware 
of the external use of 
that data. As this report 
will show, the electoral 
register is not just used 
for the purpose of running 
elections. It is also used for 
commercial activity and 
the prevention of other 
government objectives 
such as anti-fraud 
measures. These issues with 
transparency and citizen rights have been less of a 
feature of the debate on AVR to date. This report 
aims to bring these issues to the fore.
The need for proactive voter registration 
modernisation
1.10  The world does not stand still. There have 
been major changes in the nature of society 
since the voter registration system was first 
developed in the context of the First World 
War. These changes include a much more 
mobile population, greater diversity and 
changed expectations from citizens about 
how they think governmental bodies work – 
The world does not  
stand still. There have 
been major changes 
 in the nature of 
society since the voter 
registration system was 
first developed in the 
context of the First  
World War.
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and how they should work. All government 
services need to keep track with these 
developments or there will be a decline in 
their effectiveness and performance.   
1.11  Well run elections also require proactive 
steps to address gaps in participation 
and under-registration. Drifts towards 
increasing under-registration don’t affect 
everyone evenly. As this report shows, it is 
increasingly the young that are missing from 
the electoral register. This can have profound 
consequences for electoral boundaries, 
representation and voter participation. 
1.12  Electoral modernisation is therefore an 
important part of any government’s agenda.  
It has been so in recent years, with reforms 
such as the move to continuous registration, 
individual electoral registration and the 
modernisation of the canvassing process.  
This report, however, aims to consider 
whether direct enrolment should be part of 
the next steps of this modernisation.
Report Structure and Approach
1.13  This report involved:
 -  Desk research of policy documents and 
academic research on voter registration in 
the UK and overseas
 -  Interviews with UK-based stakeholders 
in the electoral community, alongside 
interviews with overseas organisations who 
have already implemented AVR to learn 
lessons from their experiences
 -  Data collection on international electoral 
registration systems based on election 
observation reports and other sources.
 -  An open web-survey through which 
stakeholders could provide further input.
 -  A site visit to an electoral registration office 
to see the current system in action.
 -  Freedom of Information requests to 
several government departments and 
governmental agencies to ascertain the 
volume of applications for/transactions 
with a variety of government services.
1.14  The report begins with a brief policy history 
of how we got to where we are today in 
Chapter 2, a stone’s throw away from AVR.  
Chapter 3 then outlines how the electoral 
registration currently functions, including the 
recent move to automatic re-registration.  
Nine fundamental problems are set out in 
Chapter 4, which the move to AVR could, 
according to its supporters, address in 
some respect. Chapter 5 puts the UK into 
international perspective by looking at how 
voter registration is run overseas and how 
AVR has been introduced in other countries. 
Chapter 6 considers some of the ethical, 
legal and practical arguments and challenges 
that AVR would bring. Chapter 7 considers 
options for how AVR could work, if it was 
to be introduced. Chapter 8 expands on this 
by providing information on the ‘moments’ 
where voter registration could be integrated 
into a citizen’s life in the future. The 
conclusions and recommendations are then 
summarised out in Chapter 9.
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2.1  The UK’s electoral registration system, like 
much of the nation’s infrastructure, has 
Victorian origins. Electoral registers were 
used for the first time after 1832, where the 
duty was given to the parish officers who 
oversaw the poor laws. They invited citizens 
to claim to be on the register in June each 
year. Claimants would be excluded from the 
register if they had not paid their taxes. A list 
was openly published in July and provision 
made for objections to be made about any 
name on the register. In the case of a dispute 
claimants and objectors would be required to 
attend court. In practice, much of the work to 
register voters was done by political parties, 
who also worked to often object to the 
entries brought in by their opponents (James 
2012, 125-68; O’Leary 1962; Seymour 1915).
2.2  The First World War provided the next major 
trigger for change. The war led to major 
human displacement which meant that earlier 
registers were outdated. Meanwhile, the 
expansion of the franchise meant that many 
more people needed to be added to the 
register. The Representation of the People 
Act (RPA) 1918 established the new system 
in which there would be regular door-to-door 
canvassing of properties to ensure that the 
register was as accurate and complete as 
possible. The RPA1918 made provision for 
two registers per year to be made, but this 
was reduced to one eight years later to save 
money as part of the Economy (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1926.
2.3  Very little change occurred until the start 
of the twenty-first century and the election 
of New Labour who undertook a broader 
range of changes to how the electoral 
machinery functioned. The Representation 
of the People Act 2000 introduced a move 
from a periodic system to a continuous 
system. There were also some significant 
moves towards the introduction of individual 
electoral registration (IER). Britain had long 
had a system of household voter registration 
whereby one ‘head of household’ could 
complete a registration form on behalf of 
all citizens living in a household. IER was 
introduced into Northern Ireland in 2002 and 
legislation was being prepared to bring it into 
force across the remainder of the UK by the 
New Labour government.
2.4  The Coalition government fast-tracked the 
move to IER. The Electoral Registration and 
Administration Act 2013 stated that every 
single citizen would be required to register 
individually. They would also be required to 
provide their date of birth and a National 
Insurance number as personal identifiers.  
The system had already been introduced 
to Northern Ireland, but it would now run 
across the UK. The Act also introduced a 
move to online voter registration and the 
checking of new entries against government 
databases. The legislation also ended plans, 
developed by the Labour government, to 
develop a single electoral register as part of 
the CORE project. Mark Harper, Minister 
for Political and Constitutional Reform, said 
that ‘the costs of building and running the 
database are disproportionate to its potential 
benefits’, quoting an estimated £11.4 million 
implementation cost, and £2.7 million per 
annum to run (UK Government 2011).
2.5  IER became a reality across the rest of the 
UK in 2014 after which all citizens had to 
register under the new system. Names were 
initially carried over from the old registers 
until December 2015, after which citizens 
who had not registered individually were 
removed. Concerns were raised about 
whether the completeness of the electoral 
register had been affected by the change. 
2 | Towards AVR?  A Policy History
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Academic studies predicted that students and 
young people were less likely to be registered 
as a result (James 2014). The Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee, notably 
in its 2014 report on Voter Engagement 
(Select Committe on Political and Constitutional 
Reform 2014)  therefore voiced concerns. This 
was followed by the All-Party Parliamentary 
Group on Democratic Participation’s report 
on the Missing Millions (Bite the Ballot, James, 
and ClearView Research 2016). Data on the 
eventual trends are summarised in Chapter 4.
2.6  Reforms followed to address problems with 
the completeness of the register and deal 
with some of the other side effects of the 
new process. The Higher Education Research 
Act 2017 introduced a requirement for 
universities to encourage their students 
to register to vote.3 Further modernisation 
followed in 2019. The Minister presented 
the Representation of the People Act (Annual 
Canvass) (Amendment) Regulations 2019, 
which brought an important move towards 
automatic re-registration by reforming the 
canvassing process from 2020 onwards.4  
2.7  The Electoral Commission gave support to 
connecting voter registration more closely 
with other public services, in its report on the 
2017 general election (Electoral Commission 
2017b). It then published some feasibility 
studies in 2019 to examine whether EROs 
could be given access to other forms of data.  
It reported that it would be possible from a 
‘technical and operational perspective and 
could be implemented without radically 
altering the structure of the electoral 
registration system in the UK’ (Electoral 
Commission 2019d, 1). 
2.8  Recent legislation has given Scotland and 
Wales greater power to manage the register 
for local government – the register which is 
also used for their respective Parliaments.5  
This has led to discussions about whether 
reforms could be introduced in these 
jurisdictions without UK-wide reform.  Wales 
and Scotland also passed legislation to lower 
the franchise to 16 for these elections.6
2.9  The Welsh government has taken 
forward recommendations from the Voter 
Engagement report to introduce the Local 
Government and Elections (Wales) Bill, 
currently before the Senedd at the time of 
writing, which would introduce AVR as it 
‘provides for a power for EROs to add an 
individual to the electoral register without 
the need for them to apply.’  It would also 
establish a framework to facilitate a single 
electoral register for Wales.7
 
2.10  The Scottish government introduced the 
Scottish Elections (Reform) Bill in September 
2019 to alter the role and remuneration 
of Returning Officers,8 but more ambitious 
reforms for electoral registration were not 
taken forward, as the Standards, Procedures 
and Public Appointments Committee noted.9
Summary
2.11  There has been major public policy concern 
about whether the UK electoral registration 
system is fit for purpose and greater interest 
in AVR. There are now new devolved powers 
to Scotland and Wales to manage their 
electoral registers for local government 
and devolved elections. This is therefore a 
critical juncture in which there is an historic 
opportunity to further modernise the UK’s 
electoral registration, and opportunities 
to explore further innovation in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.
3 http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/
electoral-registration-and-administration-act-2013-committee/electoral-registration-and-
administration-act-2013/written/106497.html
4 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/1451/pdfs/uksiem_20191451_en.pdf
5 The Wales Act 2017 and the Scotland Act 2016
6 Senedd and Elections (Wales) Act 2020.
7 https://www.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/pri-ld12877-em/pri-ld12877-em-e.pdf 
p. 14-7.
8 https://www.parliament.scot/S5_Bills/Scottish%20Elections%20%20(Reform)%20Bill/
SPBill53PMS052019.pdf
9 https://sp-bpr-en-prod-cdnep.azureedge.net/published/SPPA/2020/1/14/Stage-1-Report-
on-the-Scottish-Elections--Reform--Bill/SPPAS052020R01.pdf 
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Who is responsible for running electoral 
registration in the UK? How does the electoral 
registration system currently work? This chapter 
answers both of these questions in turn. 
Electoral Registration Today: Who does what?  
3.1  Parliament in Westminster alone has the 
power to set legislation governing the UK 
Parliamentary register although Ministers 
can use secondary legislation for some 
changes. Legislative competence for the 
local government register in Scotland was 
devolved to the Scottish Parliament by the 
Scotland Act 2016. Legislative competence 
for the local register in Wales was devolved 
to the National Assembly for Wales by 
the Wales Act 2017. Scottish and Welsh 
Ministers can both make changes to the 
respective processes as exercisable by a 
Minister in Westminster, provided that 
they were within the powers of devolved 
competence.  
3.2  There is a very decentralised system for 
registering voters and maintaining the register. 
Responsibility for maintaining the electoral 
register resides with the Electoral Registration 
Officer (ERO). They are an employee of local 
government, but are independent of local 
government for their statutory responsibilities 
relating to the electoral register. They are 
instead accountable to the courts system as 
an independent statutory officer and can be 
prosecuted for being in breach of their duties.  
EROs are appointed by the appropriate local 
council(s).  
3.3  EROs are supported by an administrative 
team in each local authority which tends 
to consist of a Democratic Services Officer 
who provides strategic level management, 
an Electoral Services Manager who manages 
the day-to-day running of the elections 
department and makes preparations for the 
poll and an administrative support team.  
In most local authorities this team tends 
to be very small, but might be boosted by 
several short-term appointments during the 
immediate election period.
3.4  In Scotland, EROs are appointed by a 
combination of local authorities. The 
ERO also serves as the Assessor in the 
Joint Valuation Boards (JVBs), who have 
responsibility for the administration of 
local taxation and to compile the electoral 
register.  A Chief Electoral Officer acts as 
both the Returning Officer (RO) and Electoral 
Registration Officer in Northern Ireland.
3.5  The Electoral Commission was established in 
2000. It did not originally have any direct role 
in the registration of electors, however, until 
it was granted powers to set performance 
standards for EROs, as well as ROs. Its role 
is otherwise in the provision of guidance to 
electoral officials and the creation of pooled 
resources. There are also many organisations 
such as the Electoral Management Body 
for Scotland, Association of Electoral 
Administrators, SOLACE, SOLAR and Scottish 
Assessors Association who play a role in the 
development of training and guidance for 
electoral officials, but do not play a direct role in 
the management of the electoral register either.
3.6  Like Victorian pipework, or early 
underground train systems, the system for 
electoral registration has therefore been one 
of incremental change with systems layered 
on top of old infrastructure. It has become 
increasingly complex over time, partly as a 
result of devolution.
3 | How Electoral Registration Works in the UK
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Like Victorian pipework, or early
underground train systems, the system for 
electoral registration has therefore been 
one of incremental change with systems 
layered on top of old infrastructure. It has 
become increasingly complex over time, 
partly as a result of devolution
10 In practice, few, if any EROs issue civil penalties for 
non-registration so it is effectively unenforced.16  | How Electoral Registration Works in the UK
How the Electoral Registration Works
How voters apply to register
3.7  Registration is compulsory in the UK and 
citizens can be fined for not registering.10  
Since 2014 it has been an individual’s own 
responsibility to register and they cannot rely 
on a parent, carer or housemate to register 
them on their behalf.
3.8  There are two main pathways through which 
citizens can apply to register to vote.  
 •  An online application via the UK 
government’s website (Figure 1.1).
 •  The annual canvass. This is a yearly check 
on the completeness and accuracy of the 
electoral register at each property.  As 
paragraph 3.28 explains, this will be revised 
for the 2020 canvass, but involved two-stage 
process after the introduction of IER. First, 
Household enquiry forms (HEFs) were sent to 
all households between July and November. 
These detailed existing electors known to be 
registered at the address. Households were 
then asked to confirm the details and notify 
the ERO of any changes. Second, Invitation 
to Register (IRV) forms were sent those 
who identified as missing from the register, 
following the return of a HEF. Only once 
an IRV form has been completed would an 
application be processed. 
Figure 1.1: Online voter registration form
3.9  In both cases citizens are asked to provide their:
 •  full name
 •  date of birth
 •  current address 
 •  previous address where they have ceased 
to reside in the last 12 months
 •  National Insurance number (or information 
about why they are not able to do so)
 •  Nationality 
 •  Whether they wish to be excluded from the 
edited/open register
 •  A declaration that the contents of the 
application is true
 •  The date of the application
The New Annual Canvass System
Automatic re-registration goes live in the UK 
in 2020.
Citizens who can be matched against national 
and local data sources will no longer need to 
reply to the canvass if their details are correct 
(described as the ‘Route 1’ pathway).
EROs will continue to canvass those who 
can’t be matched via data sources (‘Route 2’ 
pathway).
Those who live in specific property types can 
be re-registered by a ‘gatekeeper’ such as a 
building manager or care homeowner (‘Route 
3’ pathway).
Processing applications
3.10  Each application is run through the Cabinet 
Office’s Individual Electoral Registration 
Digital Service (IERDS) to verify the applicant. 
This attempts to match the applicant’s 
National Insurance number (NINo), date of 
birth and name against the DWP Customer 
Information System (CIS). The CIS contains a 
record for all individuals who have registered 
and been issued with a National Insurance 
number which is needed to work or claim 
benefits (DWP 2018).  
3.11  EROs are provided with information from the 
IERDS as to whether there is a ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ 
in the matching process, which they then use 
to assess whether they should be added to 
the electoral register. EROs are also allowed 
to use locally held data to make a decision 
(see: paragraph 3.18). The digital matching 
process does not check nationality so is not a 
guarantee of eligibility.
11  Such analysis would also be difficult because 
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Removing names
3.12  Names remain on the electoral register 
indefinitely, unless the ERO assesses that 
an individual has ceased to be resident, is 
not eligible or that the application was made 
by a third party. In practice, this means 
that names are removed when the ERO is 
informed either by receipt of an HEF form 
or new application that they have moved.  
They are also encouraged to explore local 
data sources, however. Registered electors 
can also raise formal objections to query 
the status of other electors. Names can only 
be removed upon receipt of two pieces of 
evidence – a response to the HEF will only 
consist of one these sources. If there is no 
response to a canvass then EROs can issue 
a penalty (Hone 2014). The authors are not 
aware of any systematic collection of data 
on the number of fines issued by EROs. 11 
In practice, however, interview evidence 
conducted by one of the authors with EROs 
suggested that fines are very rarely issued 
(James 2014). Names will remain on the 
register in the event of a non-return (Electoral 
Commission 2019c, 36-40). 
Current attempts to boost voter registration
3.13  Voter outreach activity to encourage citizens 
to register to vote has been initiated by 
the Electoral Commission at election time 
as the deadlines approach. This is often in 
collaboration with other actors such as the 
UK government and NUS, and national TV 
programmes such as Gogglebox in 2015 
(Electoral Commission 2015, 34-5).   
3.14  There is a legislative requirement for EROs, 
under ‘Section 9A of the Representation of 
the People Act 1983 to take all necessary 
steps to comply with the duty to maintain 
the electoral register and to ensure, as far 
as is reasonably practicable, that all those 
eligible – and no others – are registered in it’ 
(Electoral Commission 2019c, 4).
 
3.15  The Electoral Commission also requires EROs 
to develop a public engagement strategy for 
voter registration activity in order to meet 
one of their performance standards (Electoral 
Commission 2016). This strategy should include:
 •  identifying and using data sources to 
highlight potential sources of electors who 
are less likely to be registered to vote 
 •  identifying internal and external partners to 
encourage higher voter registration rates
 •  ward level data analysis of the area, 
identifying priority areas
 •  Specifying the direct contact, media and 
advertising routes for those communities.
 •  An evaluation of the success (Electoral 
Commission 2016, 3-4)
3.16  Following a slimming down of the 
performance standards system, the Electoral 
Commission only select a small sample of 
EROs that they think are ‘at risk’ of not 
meeting the standards for assessment 
(Electoral Commission 2018). There is 
therefore no regularly published picture 
of the extent to which all EROs undertake 
the voter outreach activity. One academic 
study, however, reported that 16 per cent 
of EROs had no such strategy when asked 
as part of a survey in 2016. Falls in budgets 
were associated with the absence of a 
strategy (James and Jervier 2017, 4-5). The 
same study also reported that school visits 
were undertaken by some local authorities 
to encourage voter registration. These were 
more likely to take place in London boroughs, 
and less likely in rural areas. Austerity had 
also affected the likelihood that these would 
be undertaken (James and Jervier 2017, 5).
Local data mining
3.17  Although the move to AVR is thought to 
be a dramatic game-changer, EROs already 
undertake data-mining activities to improve 
the quality of the electoral register. Electoral 
Commission guidance states that EROs can 
demand access to locally held information 
by local authorities to improve the electoral 
register and that such request cannot be 
declined:  
  ‘Paragraph 1(5) of Schedule 2 to the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 
provides that where the ERO requests to 
inspect and/or take copies of the records 
specified in paragraph 2.42, a statutory or 
other restriction, including the GDPR, cannot 
be used to refuse disclosure of those records.’ 
(Electoral Commission 2019c, 15)
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3.18  These data sources would include, but 
are not limited to Council Tax records, 
Council Tax reductions, housing benefits, 
the Register of households in multiple 
occupation (HMOs), records held by the 
registrars of births, deaths and marriages, 
lists of residential and care homes / shelters 
/ hostels, lists of disabled people receiving 
council assistance; land registry/registers of 
Scotland; planning and building control; list 
of new British citizens held by the registrar; 
and local authority education data (Electoral 
Commission 2019c, 15-7).
3.19  The extent to which they do this, however, 
varies considerably across local authorities 
with some very proactive, and others much 
less so.  
Multiple registers
3.20  The concept of the UK electoral register 
is a misnomer. In reality, there is no single 
electoral register, but a patchwork of 
registers. There are different electoral 
registers for each geographical area covered 
by the ERO. There are also different electoral 
registers within the geographical areas 
covered by EROs because there are different 
franchises for different election types. The 
Parliamentary register contains all citizens 
eligible for general elections (which excludes 
EU citizens). Local government registers 
contain all electors eligible for local, Scottish 
and Welsh government elections (which 
includes EU citizens).
Software
3.21  Data is stored and managed by EROs using 
a variety of different software packages.  
As of 2017, there were four major private 
sector electoral management systems, and 
seven in-house packages developed by local 
authorities to manage 373 registers (Electoral 
Commission 2017a, 6).
Public availability of registers
3.22  The electoral register has never been a 
secret document. In fact, the availability of 
the electoral register has been an important 
part of the transparency and integrity of 
the system. The register is open for public 
inspection at any local authority, under 
supervision. This allows citizens and political 
parties to check for erroneous and missing 
entries. Past registers are also kept in libraries 
and archives for historical research. There 
are strict limits that prevent extracts being 
digitally recorded, scanned or photographed 
(Electoral Commission 2019c, 169-85).
3.23  Data from the electoral register is also 
electronically shared in a number of ways for 
electoral purposes, preventing crime, credit 
reference checking and jury summoning 
(Electoral Commission 2019e). EROs will share 
data with:
 •  Other EROs when electoral events have 
electoral constituencies that cross the 
local authority borders. This is necessary to 
create constituencies and issue poll cards.  
 •  The Boundary Review Commissions for the 
purpose of the boundary reviews. They will 
also provide it to the Electoral Commission.
 •  Elected representatives, candidates, their 
party agents, political parties, third parties 
that are registered with the Electoral 
Commission.
 •  Governmental organisations such as the 
all police forces in Great Britain, Security 
Service and the National Crime Agency.
 •  Credit reference agencies for the purposes 
of credit referencing and anti-money 
laundering.
3.24  The data tends to be exported from local 
software systems as a .csv file. This is then 
either emailed or transferred via data transfer 
services. Upon receipt of the data, EROs at 
a neighbouring authority will import it into 
their electoral management software system.
3.25  It is possible to register anonymously, subject 
to strict criteria (see paragraphs 4.26-4.29).
3.26  EROs are required to produce an ‘edited 
register’ or ‘open register’ which is available 
for purchase by any individual, company or 
organisation. Citizens have the opportunity 
to opt-out of this when they register to vote.  
In Scotland, any citizen under 16 years old 
is automatically opted out of the electoral 
register.12 There are no restrictions on the 
sale of the edited version of the register or on 
the uses that can be made of it.  
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Existing Data Protection Provisions
3.27  There are some legal safeguards in place 
to maintain data protection. The Electoral 
Commission guidance explains that EROs 
are considered as the ‘data controllers’ 
with a statutory duty to process personal 
information in the task of maintaining 
the electoral register. They are therefore 
expected to demonstrate that they ‘comply 
with the principles of processing personal 
data, ensuring that it is processed lawfully, 
fairly and in a transparent manner’. EROs 
do not need to appoint data protection 
officers (DPO) because they are not a ‘public 
authority’, but are advised by the Electoral 
Commission to liaise with the DPO of their 
council (Electoral Commission 2019b, 7).
Canvass reform and automatic Re-registration
3.28  In November 2019, Parliament passed the 
Representation of the People Act (Annual 
Canvass) (Amendment) Regulations 2019.  
This was a statutory instrument which 
received very little media interest coming 
immediately before the general election, but 
represents an important evolution of the 
electoral registration system, which brought 
an important move towards automatic re-
registration by reforming the canvassing 
process from 2020 onwards.13 The changes 
followed from a government consultation 
on annual canvass reform, which involved a 
collaboration with the Scottish and Welsh 
governments and was launched in October 
2018.14
3.29  From 2020 all citizens will not be canvassed 
in the same way. The canvass process will 
begin with a new ‘data discernment step’ 
in which properties on the register will be 
matched against national and local data 
sources. Where a match has been made, 
EROs will be required to send a written 
letter to each property asking for notification 
of changes, but citizens will simply be re-
registered unless there is a response.
3.30  Where national and/or local sources do not 
match against the electoral register, the 
residents of the property will be contacted 
asking them to respond to the canvass. 
EROs are required to chase non-responses, 
and there must be at least three attempts to 
contact the property, at least two of those 
must have involved visits to the property.
3.31  A specific path is set out for unique 
properties such as registered care homes, 
student accommodation, HMOs and hostels.  
In these cases, a ‘responsible person’ can 
be approached for a list of the names of the 
residents. If no response is received within a 
reasonable time period, then a full canvass of 
that property must be conducted.
3.32  The requirements for removal from the 
register remain the same (in that two pieces 
of evidence are usually required). Names 
cannot therefore be deleted just by virtue of 
a non-response to the canvass.
Summary
3.33  Electoral registration has already become 
highly digitalised. It already involves EROs 
having access to multiple databases and 
using data mining skills to ensure that the 
electoral register is as complete and accurate 
as possible – as well as knowledge of how 
laws such as the GDPR apply to this data 
access and data mining. The potential move 
to AVR has therefore been eased by these 
recent reforms.
12 Section 13 Scottish Elections (Reduction of Voting Age) Act 2015
13  ://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/1451/pdfs/uksiem_20191451_en.pdf
14  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/833308/Reform-of-the-Annual-Canvass-Statement-of-Policy.pdf 
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Electoral registers should include all 
citizens who are eligible to vote in an 
election. This is important, not only so that 
they can vote on election day, but because 
the electoral register is used for other 
civic purposes such as jury service and the 
construction of electoral boundaries.
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15  https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/our-views-
and-research/our-research/accuracy-and-completeness-electoral-registers/2019-
report-2018-electoral-registers-great-britain/completeness-great-britain
This chapter sketches out nine problems to the 
existing voter registration system that AVR has 
often been cited as having the potential to fix.
The Missing Millions
4.1  Electoral registers should include all citizens 
who are eligible to vote in an election. This 
is important, not only so that they can vote 
on election day, but because the electoral 
register is used for other civic purposes 
such as jury service and the construction 
of electoral boundaries. The completeness 
of the electoral register is defined by the 
Electoral Commission as the extent to which 
every person who is entitled to have an entry 
on an electoral register is registered’ (Electoral 
Commission 2019a).  
4.2  The completeness of the register is not the 
only issue. Electoral registers should also be 
accurate so that every name entered on the 
register is a valid, eligible citizen with correct 
registration details. A citizen should usually 
only appear once on the register (although 
there are exceptions, such as students who 
can register in two locations, but only vote 
once).  
4.3  Measuring the completeness of the electoral 
register is beset with measurement problems 
(Wilks-Heeg 2012, 60-72). Estimates from the 
Electoral Commission’s recent studies provide 
the most reliable measures of accuracy and 
completeness because they involve door-
to-door comparisons of the registers against 
resident citizens (Electoral Commission 
2019a). Table 4.1 provides estimates from 
the Electoral Commission15 which found that 
between 8.3 and 9.4 million people in Great 
Britain who were eligible to be on the local 
government registers were not correctly 
registered on the December 2018 registers. 
They have also estimated that there were 
between 4.7 and 5.6 million inaccurate 
entries on the local government registers.  
Completeness Accuracy
Parliamentary 85 % 89 %
Local government 83 % 89 %
Table 4.1: Estimates of the accuracy and Completeness of the 
Electoral Register in 2018. Source: Electoral Commission.
This methodology is expensive and time intensive, 
however, and only captures periodic snapshots 
of the state of the registers. Other sources of 
information are therefore needed to ascertain some 
of the longer-term trends. There is a clear picture 
that there has been a long-term trend towards 
citizens increasingly not being registered in the UK, 
and that this problem is getting worse (also see: 
Rosenblatt, Thompson, and Tiberti 2012). Figure 4.1 
compares the estimates of the eligible population 
to the number of people on the electoral roll. This is 
an imperfect measure of electoral registration rates, 
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‘The biggest issue is the gaps 
in the electoral register. It is 
not just that there are people 
not on the register, who should 
be, but that under registration 
is not equally or evenly 
distributed across society.  
So obviously, there is a  
problem there in terms of  
who is able to vote.’
Jessica Garland, Electoral Reform Society
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compared to undertaking door-to-door comparisons 
of the names on the electoral register against the 
resident citizens. It under-estimates the number 
of missing names because it doesn’t account for 
inaccurate or double entries. It does provide a more 
longitudinal picture of trends, however.  
 Figure 4.1: The gap between the estimated eligible electorate and 
registered voters
4.4  Figure 4.2 shows the rise in the number 
of attainers that are thought to be missing 
from the electoral register. Attainers are 
citizens who are not yet eligible to vote, but 
who are entered onto the electoral register 
because they will become enfranchised in 
the near future. Attainers will therefore be 
approaching 18 for parliamentary elections 
but could be as young as 14 in Scotland 
and Wales for local and Scottish parliament 
/ Senedd elections because of the lower 
franchise.
 
Figure 4.2: Missing attainers from the local government electoral 
registers
4.5  One possible driver for low levels of 
completeness is that citizens do not find the 
process to be convenient. The additional time 
involved in registering to vote is sufficient 
to deter many applications. Political science 
research has very consistently shown that 
the bureaucratic effort involved in registering 
and voting affects whether citizens do so 
(James and Garnett 2020; Wolfinger and 
Hoffman 2001; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980).  Citizens may not readily have a 
National Insurance number to hand when 
they want to register or may never get 
around to registering. Areeq Chowdhury from 
WebRoots Democracy told us that:
  ‘The problem with the current system is 
there’s some other barrier to people who 
are voting. So you think about an ideal 
democracy, there should be as few barriers as 
possible so people are going out to exercise 
their vote.’
4.6  Concerns were raised that the recent move 
towards IER would reduce levels of voter 
registration. Rather than a parent, spouse or 
household member being able to register, 
every citizen had to do this themselves.  
It was thought that younger people and 
students would be amongst the most 
adversely affected. The two-stage process 
to registration was also thought to make 
the process more bureaucratic. Academic 
research showed that some citizens, who 
were removed from the electoral register 
as a result of the phasing in of individual 
electoral registration, were turned away at 
the Brexit referendum, which was the first 
major national electoral event after the 
transition (James and Clark 2020). Short-
term mobilisation efforts such as voter 
registration drives and media coverage, may 
have softened some of the effects, however 
young people and students were thought to 
have seen their registration rates drop (James 
2020, 199-220). Taidgh Pledger from the 
National Union of Students told us that:
  Individual electoral registration (IER) 
continues to present considerable challenges, 
particularly in terms of getting transient 
student populations registered to vote.
Marginalised groups
4.7  Eligible voters who are missing from the 
electoral register are not evenly distributed 
across the population. This is important 
because it means that some groups may 
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receive less political representation when 
electoral boundaries are drawn. It also means 
that they may be less likely to take part in 
any election. Table 4.2 uses data from the 
Electoral Commission’s completeness and 
accuracy studies to show the most significant 
gaps in under-registration. The table is 
ranked by the gap between the lowest to 
highest category for each socio-demographic 
profile. The table illustrates huge gaps by age, 
length of residence and housing tenure.  The 
most under-registered groups are younger, 
recent movers and private renters. There 
are also major gaps by nationality with 
Commonwealth and EU citizens much less 
likely to be registered.
4.8  Table 4.2 also illustrates that gaps by 
ethnicity, disability, local authority area 
and SES group are strong as well. There are 
fewer patterns by educational attainment 
and urban/rural split. There was no gap by 
gender, although women have previously 
been found to be less likely to be registered.
Lowest Highest Gap
Age 16 and 17 year 
olds (25%)
65+ (94%) 69
Length of 
residence
Moved within last 
year (36%)
Remained in 
property for 16 
years (92%)
56
Housing 
tenure
Private renters 
(58%)
Own outright 
(91%)
33
Nationality Commonwealth 
(62%) EU (54%)
UK and Irish (86%) 32
Ethnicity ‘Other’ (62%) 
Black (75%) Asian 
(76%)
White (84%) 22
Disability Mental disability 
(82%)
Physical disability/
condition (92%)
10
Local 
authority 
type
London borough 
(76%)
Metropolitan 
Borough (86%)
10
Socio-
economic 
group
DE households 
(80%)
AB households 
(86%)
6
Highest 
qualification
GCSE (81%) BTEC (86%) 5
Urban/rural Urban (83%) Rural (85%) 2
Table 4.2: Estimates of the completeness of the local government 
electoral register, ranked by gap.  Source: authors, based on data from 
the Electoral Commission.
Voters turned away
4.9  Being on the electoral register is essential 
in order to be issued with a ballot paper on 
election day. Unfortunately, many citizens 
think that they are registered when they 
are not. A common research finding from 
poll worker surveys is that many citizens 
think that they are on the electoral register 
because they interact with other government 
services and they assume that the 
appropriate information is passed onto EROs. 
4.10  Surveys of poll workers at electoral contests 
in 2015, 2018 and 2019 repeatedly found 
that the most common problem was citizens 
asking to vote who were missing from the 
electoral register. Roughly two thirds of 
polling stations are thought to turn away at 
least one voter at general elections (Clark 
and James 2017), and half at local elections 
(James and Clark 2019).
4.11  Meanwhile, at the 2016 Brexit referendum, 
the first major electoral event following 
the transition to IER, some citizens found 
that their names had been removed under 
the new system as they arrived at the polls 
(James and Clark 2020).
Funding crises
4.12  There is considerable evidence that 
registration teams are under considerable 
resource pressure. The whole of the public 
sector has faced squeezes on funding since 
the financial crisis of 2007-8 and elections 
have not been exempt from this. The 
pressure within electoral registration offices 
has been even greater, however, because 
the move to individual electoral registration 
brought about a much more cost intensive 
system for electoral officials to administer.  
Research shows that there was a substantial 
increase in staffing costs, IT costs, stationery 
costs and postage costs. These came from 
the two-stage process involving both the 
distribution of HEF and IVR forms (James, 
2020: 214-15).
4.13  Local authorities must formally provide 
EROs with the resources that they need to 
perform their statutory duties. But in practice 
the provision of resources is subject to 
negotiation and discussion against competing 
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needs within the council. Alarmingly, 47 per 
cent of electoral officials disagreed that they 
had sufficient funding available to support 
the work required to compile the electoral 
register at the 2016 Brexit referendum (James 
and Clark, 2020). Research has also shown 
that local authorities cut back on voter 
outreach work because of financial austerity 
(James and Jervier, 2017).
4.14  Direct enrolment therefore poses the 
opportunity for local authorities to save 
money chasing citizens to register, who they 
could simply add to the electoral register 
with the information that they have at their 
fingertips, or could have at their fingertips.
Last-minute pressures
4.15  Applications to register to vote have 
increasingly become seasonal. Many electors 
apply in the immediate weeks, but usually 
days and hours ahead of the registration 
deadline. This can create an enormous 
pressure on electoral officials and the overall 
infrastructure. At the 2016 Brexit referendum 
the voter registration website crashed under 
the weight of applications. A system of 
automatic registration which could have a 
higher level of underlying completeness could 
help to take the pressure of electoral officials 
and build greater robustness into the system.
4.16  Research has shown very high underlying 
rates of stress for electoral officials in the UK 
with many having considered or having left 
the profession in recent years. This can have 
a direct effect on the quality of the election, 
as well as being important for members of 
staff themselves (James 2019). 
Duplicate applications
4.17  There are an enormous volume of duplicate 
applications to register. This is partly because 
citizens are not able to check whether they 
are already registered using an online ‘am I 
registered?’ website which is often provided 
in other countries such as Ireland. Instead 
they have to contact their ERO by phone 
or email. Many therefore register again ‘just 
in case’. Only 6 percent of electoral officials 
reported no problems with duplicates at the 
Brexit referendum (James and Clark, 2020).
Use of the register by credit reference agencies
4.18  A number of respondents to our report 
flagged the problem with the use of the 
electoral register by credit reference 
agencies. One issue is the low fee that 
they pay, proportionate to the commercial 
gain. A full copy of the electoral register is 
provided to credit reference agencies, but 
the fee that they pay EROs is negligible 
compared to the value of the register for 
their business transactions. The fee for a 
data format copy of the register is set out 
in regulations as being limited to £20 plus 
£1.50 for each 1,000 entries.16 This would 
mean that for a parliamentary constituency 
of 75,000 citizens, they would pay £132.50.  
For an electoral register the size of the UK 
parliamentary register at the 2019 general 
election, the cost would be £71,401.17
‘A big area of concern is that  
when data goes off to those 
commercial organisations,  
they also get information  
as to who has opted out. 
 
Peter Stanyon, Association for Electoral 
Administrators
4.19  A second issue is that credit reference 
agencies can merge together local electoral 
registers to produce one single national 
register. There is an irony that they therefore 
are capable of having a better overall view 
of the completeness and accuracy of the 
register than electoral officials. This remains 
a potentially very useful tool for EROs, who 
do not currently have access to the register 
outside of their own jurisdiction. 
 
16  https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/sites/default/files/2019-11/Part%204%20
Maintaining%20the%20register%20throughout%20the%20year_0.pdf p.175
17  = (£1.5*(47587254/1000))+£20.  Based on the number of registered electors 
reported by the BBC: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2019/results
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4.20  It could be argued that credit reference 
agencies should not be provided with the 
electoral register at all and that its use should 
be limited to electoral purposes. One local 
authority official told us that:
  ‘We keep our data safe, however we are 
required to provide that data to credit 
reference agencies who seem to be 
completely un-monitored in their actions.’
4.21  There is evidence, however, that many 
citizens register to vote to improve their 
credit rating rather than participate in an 
election. Removing the link with the credit 
reference agencies may therefore reduce 
levels of completeness and accuracy in the 
electoral register.  
 •  Recommendation #1: The fee that credit 
reference agencies pay for access to the 
full register should be increased in line 
with inflation since 2001. The case for a 
higher fee to fund electoral registration 
modernisation should be considered.  
 •  Recommendation #2: The sale of electoral 
registration data by credit reference 
agencies to third parties should be strictly 
prohibited.
The use of the edited register
4.22  The edited/open register is available for 
purchase by any individual, company or 
organisation without restriction for the 
purpose of the use. The edited register is 
commonly used by organisations who want to 
validate the details of their members. It is also 
used for marketing purposes by companies 
wanting to send unsolicited promotion/
marketing materials. These might be 
considered useful for promoting commercial 
enterprise within the UK.
4.23  There is public value in companies being able 
to reach potential customers, however there 
are also concerns about privacy and misuse.  
The edited electoral register contains a rich 
set of data about individual citizens, data 
which can be particularly useful in the ‘big 
data’ era as it can be aggregated with other 
data sources and used to target individuals 
for political or other purposes. One electoral 
official told us that:
  ‘Laws on who can view and use the electoral 
register could be tightened. There are 
currently no criminal record checks done for 
those that are able to use it.’
 4.24  The Electoral Commission and Association for 
Electoral Administrators are amongst many 
who have argued for the abolition of the 
edited/open register (White and Horne 2014). 
Its abolition was also called for by the Data 
Sharing Review in 2008 (Thomas and Walport 
2008). Areeq Chowdhury from WebRoots 
Democracy told us that:
  To be honest, I think the electoral register 
should just be for elections generally. I think 
that when people sign up on the electoral 
register they just want to vote. They don’t 
want their information being shared with 
some other third party.
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How 192.com use the open/edited register
192.com has compiled a citizen database made up from sources 
including the open electoral register; insolvency register; births, 
marriages & death records; land registry and business listings 
databases.  
The database allows users to search for the personal information of 
citizens.  It offers customers a detailed 27-page ‘background report’ 
on an individual, which includes data from the electoral register from 
2002-2020. Using the electoral register it provides information on 
an individual’s name, address, likely age, length of residency, other 
household occupants, previous household occupants and neighbours 
details.
192.com also stores information about which users have searched for 
a citizen, including their IP address. This information is then sold.  
192.com has been criticised for facilitating stalking, enabling fraud and 
undermining privacy.
The company has been cited as making £6.5m a year in the past. 
Sources: (192.com 2020; Benett 2013; Carr 2016; Hencke 2011; White 
2012)
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4.25  While concerns about the use of the open/
edited register have been long held, the 
increased simultaneous capturing of citizens’ 
information from their social media profile, 
browsing history and use of other digital 
applications has been raised as a concern 
as they have become more prevalent in 
society (Zuboff 2019). The combining of this 
data with the edited/open electoral register 
therefore presents increased opportunities 
for fraud and the undermining of privacy. 
192.com is an example of a company that 
makes data available from the edited/open 
register on the internet in combination with 
other sources. This type of platform has often 
been argued to have undermined privacy 
(Hencke 2011) (see Box on p.26). There are 
also potential issues related to the political 
use of this data by commercial organisations 
– the kind of work done by Cambridge 
Analytica and others can be enriched and 
be made more powerful through the use of 
electoral registration data. Whilst the precise 
impact of this kind of work to date has yet to 
be fully determined, the potential for its use 
for electoral manipulation is significant and 
will grow in the future. Guarding against it is 
therefore important.
 •  Recommendation #3: The Open/Edited 
electoral register should be abolished.
Anonymous registration
4.26  Anonymous registration is vitally important 
for citizens who want to take part in the 
electoral process, but whose circumstances 
mean that they do not want their name to 
appear publicly on the register. This would 
include, but is not limited to, domestic abuse 
victims. Women’s Aid campaigned between 
2016 and 2018 for the restrictions to 
anonymous registration to be relaxed. They 
previously required either a Court Order, 
proof of a Protection Order, or an attestation 
from either the head of the Local Authority, 
the head of the Police or the head of MI5. 
‘This obviously wasn’t very accessible for 
many survivors of domestic abuse’ Lucy 
Hadley of Women’s Aid told us.  
4.27  Changes were then brought forward 
in regulations in February 2018 which 
updated the Court Orders you can provide 
as evidence. It also expanded the list of 
attesters that could be used to include lower 
level police officers, health professionals, and 
refuge managers.
4.28  Problems remain, however, because 
anonymous registration is limited to a 
period of only 12 months. Lucy Hadley from 
Women’s Aid told us that:
  ‘Abuse obviously doesn’t end when a 
relationship ends and most victims will 
experience continued abuse and being 
frightened from the perpetrator after the 
relationship has ended. Including through 
child contact processes, divorce proceedings 
and things that carry on after you might have 
left the abusive relationship.’
4.29  An alternative that has been proposed by 
Women’s Aid is therefore at least a five-year 
period, but ideally life. They also argued that the 
range of attesters should be further broadened 
to ensure it reflect the various professionals and 
organisations survivors may disclose to. These 
appear to be important recommendations given 
the criteria of data control set out at the start 
of the report and the privacy and related issues 
identified in Chapter 6.
 •  Recommendation #4: The range of 
attesters for anonymous registration 
should be expanded to reflect victims’ lived 
experiences of abuse.
 •  Recommendation #5: Anonymous registration 
should be expanded to at least five years.
Summary
4.30  There are at least nine major challenges 
with the current system. These include low 
levels of voter registration, strains on the 
administrative system and the compromised 
privacy of voters. The introduction of 
automatic re-registration stands to make a 
major difference to the costs involved in the 
system and will allow EROs to focus their 
resources. However, there remains a need to 
consider further reforms.  
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5.1  By looking at how other countries run 
electoral registration, it is possible to have a 
greater sense of available options for reform.  
By looking at their experiences of AVR, we 
can learn more about what it might deliver in 
the UK and what risks are involved.
How electoral registration works overseas
5.2  It is possible to envisage three broad 
alternative types of electoral registration 
systems that could be found around the 
world, characterised by the extent to which 
the voter must be proactive in registering 
themselves, or they need take no action.  
There are other differences in administrative 
systems,18 but from the perspective of the 
voter, this is critical. The distinctions are 
therefore between:
 •  Laissez faire – where it is an individual 
responsibility to register and the 
government only provides the minimal 
infrastructure to help citizens.  
 •  Assisted – where there are regular prompts 
to citizens, encouraging them to register 
to vote when they interact with other 
government services.
 •  Automatic - where a citizen needs to take 
no action in order to be registered to vote – 
it is done by governmental bodies on their 
behalf.  
5.3  Table 5.1 opposite summarises the position 
of 40 countries considered to be liberal 
democracies around the world.19 There is 
no single consolidated list on which system 
is used and so a bespoke dataset was 
established, in collaboration with Professor 
Rodney Smith, University of Sydney, using 
election observation reports, official websites 
and other sources.  
Laissez faire Assisted Automatic
Cyprus Australia (varies by state) Argentina
Ireland Canada (varies by region) Austria
Jamaica USA (varies by state) Belgium
Mauritius Chile
New Zealand Costa Rica
United Kingdom Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Japan
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Panama
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Table 5.1: The use of AVR around the world
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5.4  Most countries do have some kind of 
automatic system. This is much easier in 
many polities than it is in the UK because it 
is drawn from a central population registry. 
However, there is usually an option for 
citizens to check the register to ensure 
that they are on the list and have not been 
inadvertently excluded. In the Czech Republic 
registers are not public but citizens can check 
their inclusion and request corrections up 
to two days before polling day. In Denmark 
citizens are sent voter cards and this enables 
corrections to be made up to and including 
the day of the election.  
5.5  Some countries only have automatic 
enrolment at particular ‘life moments’. All 
citizens are registered at the age of 18 in 
France from national records, but after that 
are required to notify election officials of 
a change of address. This is also the case 
in Trinidad and Tobago where citizens are 
registered when they apply for a national 
form of identification, which they can do 
upon reaching the age of 15. They are then 
transferred to the register at the age of 18.  
They need to inform the electoral authorities 
if they have subsequently moved.
5.6  There is also some variation in the data sources 
used to compiled the register automatically. 
Some electoral authorities use national civil 
registries such as Lithuania and Estonia.  Others 
rely on local sources. Switzerland used canton-
level civil registers, for example.
5.7  There are cases where there is no system 
of electoral registration. In Latvia citizens 
arrive at a polling station and must present 
their passport in order to vote. A stamp is 
then affixed in the passport to indicate that 
they have voted, to prevent multiple voting. 
Eligible citizens without a passport must 
collect a voting card three weeks prior to 
election day.20 Information is sent to local 
areas based on population registers to 
help organise the polls, however.21 Latvia is 
therefore classified as automatic since no 
action is needed by the voter, despite the 
absence of a system.
5.7.  ‘Assisted’ systems are present in countries 
such as parts of the USA, Australia and 
Canada. These require an individual to 
apply to register to vote, but there is some 
integration with other public services.  
5.8  Laissez faire systems such as Cyprus and 
New Zealand which require an application to 
be submitted, are very few in number. The 
UK system is best described as ‘laissez faire’.  
Voter registration is compulsory and there 
are sanctions for non-registration. However, 
these sanctions are so rarely applied that 
the system can be described as laissez faire.  
These countries all have direct connections 
to British imperial rule, which shows the likely 
source of the registration system.
5.9  An important trend has been for countries 
that have historically had laissez-faire 
systems to adopt forms of assisted or 
automatic voter registration because they 
have found long-term declining rates of 
registration.  In the USA, sixteen states 
and the District of Columbia have already 
approved some form of automatic voter 
registration by 2019 (Brennan Center 2019).  
Canada also moved to a system of automatic 
voter registration (Black 2003). In the next 
section we profile the case of Victoria in 
Australia, to show how automatic voter 
registration has been successful for boosting 
enrolment amongst particular groups where 
there is no population register.
What effect does AVR have? Lessons from Political 
Science in the USA
5.10  Higher rates of voter registration do not 
guarantee higher rates of voter turnout. One 
concern about introducing AVR is that it might 
not be worthwhile because it would register 
citizens, who may then not go on to vote.  
30  |  The Overseas Experience
5.11  There is a long-standing stream of political 
science research which shows voter registration 
procedures can affect turnout. Much of this 
is based on analysis of divergent procedures 
in the US, where each state historically has 
had relatively autonomy. In a famous study, 
Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978; 1980) 
compared registration practices to levels of 
participation in the US states to calculate 
the changed probabilities of an individual 
voting. They suggested that, depending on the 
existing probability that an individual would 
vote, imposing a 30-day registration deadline 
could reduce the probability by between 3 to 9 
percentage points.  
5.12  The US 1993 ‘Motor Voter Act’ forced US 
states to provide registration facilities at 
public agencies, introduce universal mail 
registration, allow citizens to register at the 
same time as applying for/renewing a driving 
licence and prohibited officials from purging 
electoral registers of non-voters. A number 
of early studies showed that this did increase 
voter participation immediately following 
its introduction, with one finding that it 
increased registration by 2.3 percentage 
points and turnout by 2.1 percentage points 
(Franklin and Grier 1997, 111).
5.13  The move to full AVR has been a more 
recent development in the US. Data has 
been collected on registrations and turnout 
statistics from all eight jurisdictions that 
implemented AVR in time for the 2018 general 
election (Morris and Dunphy 2019; Rakich 
2019). Through the AVR systems, 2.2 million 
new voters were registered and the details of 
six million were changed (Rakich 2019). The 
increase in registrations varied by as much as 
9.4% in Washington DC to 93.7% in Georgia, 
but was always positive (Morris and Dunphy 
2019, 2). Analysis has found that people 
who were registered through AVR do vote, 
but at a lower rate than those who register 
themselves. The turnout rate for AVR was 42% 
in Colorado, for example. Further research will 
be needed in future years to assess the effects 
on turnout, but the evidence so far suggests 
that it has had a positive effect – albeit not 
‘game-changing’ in nature.  
5.14  AVR requires careful and successful 
implementation, however, and there have 
been cases of problems. In the first year 
of implementation more than 100,000 
registration errors were reported in California 
including 1,500 ineligible electors being 
added to the roll (Ernst and Young 2019; 
Vasilogambros 2019).
Case Study: Direct Enrolment in Victoria, Australia 
5.15  AVR has also been partially introduced in 
Australia. The remainder of this chapter 
provides a more detailed case study of the 
effects of the reforms there, focussing in on 
the Victorian Direct Enrolment programme.  
Australia has a highly federalised system in 
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which the Australian Electoral Commission 
(AEC) is responsible for organising and 
supervising federal elections, but state and 
local government elections are overseen 
by a separate Electoral Commission in each 
state and territory. There is therefore a 
federal electoral register held by the national 
Australian Electoral Commission, and a 
register for local and state elections.
5.16  Electoral authorities traditionally relied on 
‘habitation reviews’ for voter registration.  
These were similar to the UK’s annual 
canvasses, designed 
to maintain the 
electoral register. 
As early as the 
1990s, however, 
electoral commissions 
across Australia 
began to use data 
from government 
and governmental 
agencies to write to 
people likely to need 
to enrol or change 
their enrolment 
status. This included 
the sending of a 
birthday card to 
citizens aged 17 
inviting them to register (Victorian Electoral 
Commission 2017, 1). It also included using 
data from Centrelink, Australia Post, driving 
licence data and a variety of state/territory 
level data sources to write to citizens.
5.17  The datasets were initially helpful in 
identifying people to remove, but unless 
citizens responded to the new invitation 
then more names would drop off the register 
than would be added on. A decline in the 
response rates to these invitations therefore 
led to calls for automatic enrolment (Victorian 
Electoral Commission 2017, 1). Direct 
enrolment first came to New South Wales 
after the NSW Parliament passed legislation 
to enable SmartRoll in 2009. Victoria 
followed in 2010 and the Commonwealth 
Parliament in 2012 (Reader 2015). 
5.18  The NSW SmartRoll system was praised 
by a cross party parliamentary group as a 
‘considerable achievement’ (JSCEM 2012, 
39), a few years after implementation.  
When citizens updated their address with 
another NSW agency (driving licence 
data, schools data, and home ownership 
data), this information was passed onto 
the NSW electoral officials who could 
then automatically update the electoral 
roll. Electors were then notified by SMS, 
email or letter. Of the 42,172 SmartRolled 
voters ahead of the 2011 NSW elections, 
72% exercised their right to vote (JSCEM, 
2012: 58). The scheme was ended in 
2019, however, as the state moved to use 
alternative data sources provided by the 
national AEC.
5.19     At the federal level 
direct enrolment involved 
data being transferred from 
public agencies such as 
the State and Territory’s 
Driver’s Licence Authorities 
and Australian Tax Office.  
Citizens would be added to 
the register or have their 
details changed if the AEC 
decided that it had sufficient 
information to be confident 
of the change.  Citizens 
would then be written to 
and would have 28 days to 
respond if the details were 
incorrect (AEC 2019).
The Victorian Direct Enrolment Scheme
5.20  The Victorian Direct Enrolment scheme, 
focussed on in more detail here, involved 
enrolling new electors, and not updating 
current registrants. Citizens would be 
automatically added to the register 21 days 
after an elector turned 18. The programme 
began by auto-enrolling and writing to nearly 
2,000 students who were registered with 
the educational authorities but who were 
missing from the register. This was expanded 
to using data from the Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection, as well as 
data on death, births and marriage records. 
A legislative amendment was passed in 2013 
which permitted the Victorian Electoral 
Commission to automatically enrol citizens 
who were on the AEC’s federal roll. 
5.21  The number of new direct enrolments reached 
191,849 per year in 2015/16 (Victorian 
Electoral Commission 2017, 2).  These new 
enrolments were more likely to be male 
Direct enrolment  
in Victoria was  
very effective at 
encouraging voting  
for first-time voters
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(56.8%). The majority (45.8%) were in the 
18-19 age category, with many others in the 
20-24 (22.9%) and the 25-29 (13.2%) category 
(Victorian Electoral Commission 2017, 3-4).  
5.22  There was concern that direct enrolment 
might simply add citizens onto the register 
who might not vote. There was some 
evidence of this. A notable finding was that 
61.7% of direct enrollers cast their vote in 
the 2014 state elections, compared to 93.0% 
of all enrolled citizens. It was very noticeable, 
however, that 79.4% of 18-19 year old direct 
enrollers did cast their ballot. It was the 
older age groups where direct enrollers were 
less likely to participate (Victorian Electoral 
Commission 2017, 11-2). Importantly, direct 
enrolment was therefore a very effective at 
encouraging voting for first-time voters. 
5.23  Feedback from directly enrolled electors 
showed that relatively few (7%) had 
deliberately not enrolled themselves. The 
most common reason for not registering 
themselves was that they had assumed that 
the VEC would register them (42%), that 
they were going to get round to enrolling 
(30%), that they had forgot (13%), didn’t 
know how (14%) or didn’t know that they 
needed to (13%). The vast majority were in 
favour of direct enrolment (82%) with a small 
proportion (4%) disagreeing with it (Victorian 
Electoral Commission 2017, 18). Concerns 
about privacy were raised from time to time.  
As one official from the VEC told us:
  ‘We often get concerns about privacy: how 
do you get my information, where did you 
get it from? Why are you using it to update 
my enrolment?  Those questions come fairly 
regularly.’
5.24  Mechanisms for improving the transfer of 
the data improved considerably over time to 
reduce cyber security threats. The VEC was 
originally using CD-ROMs and USB sticks for 
data transfers. A private cloud service was 
subsequently set up.
5.25  No public estimates have been published 
about the net cost effect involved in 
introducing AVR. One official told us, however, 
that direct enrolment provided 10-15 percent 
of the enrolment in Victoria.  Without direct 
enrolment, there would be the need to chase 
eligible citizens and there would be 10-15% 
more time spent processing.
Summary
5.26  AVR is the norm, not the exception in 
countries around the world.  Many countries 
that have historically not had AVR because 
of the absence of a population register 
are now increasingly turning to introduce 
either direct enrolment for specific groups 
or assisted voter enrolment through 
other public agencies.  These innovations, 
where they have been well-designed, have 
proven to be able to deliver cost savings 
and boost voter registration for specific 
groups. Successful implementation is reliant 
on identifying reliable new data sources, 
training, resources and project management, 
however.
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AVR is the norm, not the exception 
in countries around the world. Many 
countries that have historically not 
had AVR because of the absence 
of a population register are now 
increasingly turning to introduce 
either direct enrolment for specific 
groups or assisted voter enrolment 
through other public agencies.
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The report has so far identified some areas of 
critical strain in the UK’s electoral registration 
system, and that some form of AVR is the norm 
in liberal democracies around the world.  There 
are a number of philosophical questions to be 
considered when contemplating the case for AVR, 
however, which this chapter aims to introduce.
The case for voluntary voter registration
6.1  The most obvious question is whether voter 
registration should be opt-in, or opt-out.  
One common argument that has been raised 
against AVR is that it should be an individual’s 
responsibility to register themselves and/
or that an individual should have a right 
not to be registered. These arguments 
have commonly been raised where AVR is 
being proposed. For example, the Liberal 
Party opposed AVR in New South Wales, 
Australia, stating that ‘we do not believe that 
it is the right of the State to put people on 
the register’ (JSCEM 2012, 38). In a debate 
on AVR in the UK Parliament in 2016, 
meanwhile, the Minister for the Cabinet 
Office, John Penrose, raised the concern 
about whether automatically adding citizens 
to the electoral register contravened civil 
liberties:
  ‘There is a difference between an opt-in 
system, where we say, “We know you’re 
living there, but do you want to register?” and 
an opt-out system, which is one possibility,  or 
a “we’re not even going to ask you” system, 
which is a bit more dangerous. Whether 
that is really acceptable in a free society is 
a bit more questionable; it is tricky in some 
respects from a civil liberties point of view.’ 
(Hansard 2016, Volume 612, Column 146WH)
 
6.2  The Coalition government originally held 
voter registration is an act ‘of personal choice 
and as such there should be no compulsion 
placed on an individual to make an 
application to register to vote’ (Deputy Prime 
Minister 2011, 20-1). It therefore proposed to 
abolish the fine for the non-completion of an 
electoral registration form.  
The case for mandatory voter registration
6.3  One of the arguments for mandatory voter 
registration is that voting is a positive 
act, from which all individuals gain, and it 
should therefore be promoted by the state. 
If a citizen casts a ballot then their voice 
is more likely to be heard by government, 
parliamentarians and other elected officials 
(Dahl 1971). Voting can also build civic 
education as citizens consider who to vote 
for at an election (Sheppard 2015). One 
person voting can also lead to others voting 
(Nickerson 2008). The state therefore has a 
responsibility for taking action to encourage 
everyone to vote (James and Garnett 2020). 
6.4  Another argument for mandatory voter 
registration is that at the collective 
level, citizens mutually gain from higher 
participation. Higher turnout can increase 
confidence and legitimacy in the result of an 
election. 
 
6.5  A further argument in favour of mandatory 
voter registration is that, without it, electoral 
registers and election outcomes will not 
be representative of the public. The ACE 
Electoral Knowledge Network explains that:
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  Inevitably some voters will choose not 
to register, thereby effectively depriving 
themselves of the right to vote. If there is 
a random distribution to the likelihood of 
registering to vote  that is, if all types of 
citizens register in equal proportions, whether 
men or women, young or old, urban or rural, 
rich or poor, highly or poorly educated, 
and so on  the conclusion might be that 
voluntary registration has no impact on the 
outcome of an election or on the selection of 
representatives and governments.22
6.6  Electoral registers are also currently used for 
purposes beyond conducting an election, 
such as the drawing of electoral boundaries, 
the detection of crime and jury service. If 
voter registration was optional, then some 
groups would be less likely to be represented 
in Parliament and the judicial process would 
be less representative.
6.7  It is already current law that every citizen 
is registered. Voter registration is therefore 
not currently an ‘opt-in’ process. This report 
progresses on the assumption that this 
continues to be the case. AVR is therefore a 
policy to help administratively best realise the 
current goal of full, compulsory registration. 
However, voters should be aware of how 
information about them is being shared.  
There is therefore a case for an ‘opt-in’ when 
registering via other government services.
 •  Recommendation #6: Voter registration 
should remain compulsory across the UK
Automatic or assisted voter registration?
6.8  Using a variety of non-electoral data 
sources to register citizens raises a separate 
question about whether citizens need to 
grant permission for this information to be 
transferred. Should a citizen be asked, for 
example, when they pay their Council Tax 
whether they should like to register to vote at 
that point? As the previous chapter outlined, 
this would be assisted registration. Or should 
they not be granted the opportunity to be 
asked and automatically added to the roll?  
This would be automatic registration.
6.9  One argument for asking them – an ‘opt-in’ 
system – is that they should retain greater 
control of their data. If direct registration was 
introduced without the consent of the voter, 
then their details might be passed onto credit 
reference agencies or even third parties via 
the open/edited register, without their full 
understanding.  
6.10  An argument against asking for consent, 
however, is that they may decline.  
Administratively cost-effective ways of 
boosting the accuracy and completeness of 
the electoral register would therefore not be 
achievable.  For example, people might avoid 
supplying if they became concerned that the 
data might be used in other ways, not just 
amending the electoral register but making 
the data available to others via the electoral 
register. This is another reason to restrict 
the use of the register to what is strictly 
necessary – avoiding commercial or political 
use of the register – as it would reduce this 
possible chilling effect.
 •  Recommendation #7: If AVR is introduced, 
then directly enrolled citizens must not 
have their details added to the open/
edited register (should that register not be 
abolished).
Does compulsory voter registration 
contravene civil liberties?
The question of whether a person has a 
right not to be registered to vote could be 
seen as a civil liberties issue but in most 
ways this is a stretch as the civil liberties 
issues surround the way the electoral roll 
could be misused rather than used for its 
primary function. If the register can only be 
used in relation to actual voting the impact 
upon civil liberties is effectively nil.
The problems arise where the register 
is used for other purposes – whether 
intentionally for political or other analyses 
or for marketing purposes to raise money 
to fund the register – or unintentionally 
through function creep, data breaches or 
worse, or through the potential use for 
issues such as immigration enforcement. 
Avoiding these kinds of uses would be a civil 
liberties issue – so the key is legal uses and 
by ensuring security of the register is taken 
as seriously as possible.
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Privacy and data protection issues
6.11  AVR raises some important privacy and data 
protection questions. At the outset, however, 
it is important to note that privacy issues and 
data protection issues are not the same. There 
are aspects of privacy that are not related 
to data protection – the ‘chilling effect’ that 
means that knowing you will be on a list in the 
hands of the government and others could 
have an influence on whether you perform 
some task or avoid some key activity, for 
example. There are data protection issues 
that are more based on the way the law works 
than on privacy itself. When considering 
privacy, therefore, it is important not to 
reduce the process 
to a ‘compliance 
tickbox’ related to the 
precise terms of the 
GDPR, but to take a 
broader look at the 
implications of what is 
being suggested.
6.12  Privacy issues can 
occur at each stage 
of the process. At 
the data gathering 
stage, there are 
privacy issues 
when considering 
whether a particular 
data source might 
be used. Would the knowledge that the 
data source could be used for an electoral 
database change anything about that data 
source itself? Would people be less willing 
to contribute to it? Is the use of it for an 
electoral register consistent with the way in 
which the source itself was compiled? Would 
its use for an electoral register be expected 
or understandable for those whose data is 
being considered? Should the people whose 
data is being gathered be informed, or be 
given the chance to opt-out of their data 
being gathered from this source? These are 
practical, ethical and potentially legal issues – 
in different circumstances they could bring in 
the lawfulness of the use of the data from a 
GDPR perspective into question. 
6.13  There are privacy issues in relation to the 
holding of data. These include security issues 
– these kinds of issues are relevant to any 
government database, but if the data is held 
in a particular structure and concentrated 
way they can become more significant. A 
larger database is a larger target. One that 
is guaranteed to be especially accurate and 
reliable, as an electoral register would have 
to be, is potentially more valuable to hackers 
and others. One that includes specific 
location data, as well as personal details such 
as age and nationality, is also correspondingly 
of more potential value to those hackers.
6.14  The point is not just that the data is valuable 
on its own – for marketing, for potential 
targeting of customers or victims of scams, 
for demographic profiling and potential 
political manipulation – but that it can be 
combined with other data 
to make that data more 
valuable and more risky. 
For example, if social media 
data has been scraped and 
analysed to find online 
activity of people with 
particular views, but those 
online identities can’t be 
matched to real people in 
the real world, getting hold 
of the electoral register 
could allow the data to be 
matched and those online 
identities located in the real 
world. Conversely, if the 
electoral data allows you to 
find people in a particular 
‘swing’ constituency, it could be matched up 
with that social media political activity data 
to find persuadable people in that swing 
constituency to try to change their vote, 
make them more or less likely to vote and so 
forth. This is just one example in the political 
sphere – the potential uses in this and other 
spheres are immense.
6.15  All these factors mean that the security issues 
on an electoral database are particularly 
significant, especially if data is to be combined 
into a single, central register, as discussed 
below.  Once data has been hacked or lost, the 
privacy issues grow - because the control over 
the data has been lost, and how it can be used, 
where else it could be sold or made available, 
is no longer in the hands of those who should 
have been responsible for it. 
The data is valuable  
on its own but can  
be combined with other 
data to make that data 
more valuable and  
more risky.
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Possible data misuse issues
6.16  Perhaps the biggest of the privacy issues, 
however, relate to the possible misuse of the 
data. Misuse can come in a number of forms:
 •  Accidental misuse – where the data is used 
for something that the user does not realise 
is not acceptable or appropriate. 
 •  Intentional misuse – where the data is used 
for something that the user realises might 
not be appropriate but does it regardless. 
 •  Function creep (or mission creep) - where 
a new use is found for data, one that was 
not originally envisaged but emerges later, 
perhaps as ideas change, or attitudes 
change, or in response to a particular event.
6.17  The first issue, accidental misuse, is best 
guarded against by well-written policies and 
well-trained staff, as well as clear limitations 
on the planned use. The more limited the 
allowable uses, the easier it is to see that 
another use would not be appropriate. This 
also helps guard against intentional misuse, 
as it reduces the potential grey areas so 
discourages moving into them. Again, well-
written policies are key here, together with 
appropriate penalties and procedures to deal 
with breaches.
6.18  Function creep/mission creep is perhaps 
the hardest to deal with. This happens 
with regularity in most fields where data is 
concerned. For example, the ANPR camera 
system designed for the London Congestion 
Charge was originally intended just for that 
charge, but soon began to be used for the 
detection and prevention of crime. Function 
creep generally happens for what appear to 
be good reasons at the time – sensible ideas, 
efficient uses of resources, ways to solve 
difficult or immediate problems – but that 
does not mean that it is necessarily a good 
idea in other ways. It means that assessments 
of privacy risk, for example, may need to be 
reperformed. It means that consent that was 
originally given for the use of data may no 
longer be valid. It also potentially leads to 
further function/mission creep. One new idea 
leads to another. A database like the electoral 
register could have many such possible uses 
– and many associated risks.
6.19  There are two keys to guarding against 
function creep. The first, as for the other 
two key forms of data misuse, is to limit 
the allowed uses from the start as tightly 
as possible. If no commercial use of the 
electoral register is allowed, for example, 
then the temptation to look for further uses 
disappears. The second is to be aware of the 
possibility of function creep, so to refuse 
even what seem to be very sensible and 
appropriate possible additional uses of the 
database. This is much harder to do as the 
idea of getting the maximum value from a 
database is a strong one, and the idea that 
sharing data is essentially a good thing is 
compelling. It is, however, in privacy terms a 
very risky one.
Is there a need for a data trust law?
6.20  Rather than a specific law being needed 
to deal with potential misuse of electoral 
databases, the provisions of existing data 
protection law should be applied strictly 
and carefully. If the precise uses to which 
databases might be used are set out clearly 
and restrictively then data protection law 
should mean that inappropriate use is 
prevented.
6.21  There are complications to this, however, 
that need to be monitored closely. One is the 
impact of Brexit on the way that the GDPR 
applies in the UK, which is not yet clear. It 
has been suggested that after Brexit, data 
protection laws might be weakened – this 
might have an impact on electoral databases.  
If this happens, specific restrictions should 
be written into any revised data protection 
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law. The second is how the exemptions from 
the GDPR built into the Data Protection Act 
2018 are used in practice. There is a specific 
exemption for immigration (Schedule 2 (4)) in 
particular that needs careful monitoring. An 
argument could be made that the register 
could be used for immigration enforcement 
– if you are not on the register you could 
be assumed to be worthy of investigation, 
for example. This would be function creep/
mission creep and should be avoided not just 
for its immediate impact but as a precursor to 
further uses for ‘enforcement’.
 •  Recommendation #8: Legal restrictions 
on the use of the electoral register should 
be considered should GDPR laws change 
following Brexit.
Data security and cyber threats
6.22  There are inevitably cyber threats involved in 
voter registration systems.  As the Center for 
Internet Security notes: 
  ‘In general, voter registration systems exhibit 
the risk characteristics of a general-purpose 
computing system and, more specifically, any 
network connected database application.  To 
properly mitigate risks, each voter registration 
system…  and links to the voter registration 
system, needs a comprehensive assessment of 
its technical characteristics and the application 
of appropriate security controls’ (Center for 
Internet Security 2018, 16).  
6.23  Cyber security weaknesses are important 
because they can lead to the leaking of 
personal information which can undermine 
privacy, as this chapter has already considered. 
It can also lead to problems such as tampered 
registers which could enable electoral fraud, or 
the deliberate sabotage of electoral registers 
which could prevent elections from being held 
reliably and on time.
6.24  The strength of the election infrastructure 
in a given country to provide election 
security reflects the range of actors available 
to redress and respond to cyber security 
breaches (Brown et al. 2020, forthcoming). In 
this sense, the UK is well equipped with a 
range of bodies including the National Cyber 
Security Agency, in addition to the Electoral 
Commission, Cabinet Office, local authorities, 
private sector suppliers and a strong 
university network.  
6.25  The current separation of the UK’s electorate 
into multiple local registers also provides a 
degree of increased security since the data 
is dispersed and there are fewer connections 
than there otherwise would be with a single 
centralised dataset. There are no known 
high-profile breaches of the UK electoral 
registration system that the authors are 
aware of, compared to the US (United States 
Senate Intelligence Committee 2019a, 2019b).  
At the 2016 Brexit referendum, however, 
the voter registration website crashed, and 
a targeted distributed denial of service was 
not ruled out as a potential reason why the 
site was temporarily unavailable (The Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs 
Committee 2017).
6.26  The Electoral Commission has already 
undertaken feasibility studies of the 
automatic transfer of data using the IER 
Digital Gateway and found it to be a reliable 
system (Electoral Commission 2019d).   
Interviews and written submissions to this 
report provided no evidence that there 
would be a greater threat of cyber security 
as a result of transferring more data through 
the IER Gateway – since secure information 
already passes through this route.  As one 
administrator claimed: ‘Local government 
already has a lot of information on citizens 
for tax purposes, this would be no different.’ 
The move to AVR would increase the number 
of connected datasets and the security of 
each would have to be carefully assessed.  
The strong network capacity of the election 
sector, however, should mean that delivering 
AVR securely would be possible.
Centralised register
6.27  The UK government had proposed the 
implementation of a single electoral register 
with the Co-ordinated On-line Register of 
Electors (CORE) project, which was legislated 
for in 2006. This was repealed in 2013, 
however, because of concerns about cost 
(see paragraph 2.4). Wales plans to introduce 
a Welsh Database of Electoral Registration 
Information of local government electors.
6.28  The advantage of a centralised register is 
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that it would enable EROs to be more readily 
able to check for the duplicate electors in 
the register. The register would involve each 
citizen having a unique electoral identifier.  
Should they receive a wider set of data to 
update the register or direct enrolments, as 
sketched out in this report, then they would 
be able to check when/where they were 
registered elsewhere. Lastly, EROs would be 
more efficiently and securely able to transfer 
data to other EROs for the purposes of 
electoral events rather than exporting data 
through locally held files.
6.29  The main disadvantage is that the reliance 
on one single register for all electoral events 
would create a data ‘honeypot’ which hackers 
may want to target. Pascal Crowe from the 
Open Rights Group said that:
  ‘You’d have to be very careful about how you 
stored that data because if you are storing it 
all in one place then essentially the risk of it 
getting hacked is higher because, obviously, 
a big database is worth more to hackers than 
lots of small databases.’
  There would also be costs involved in setting 
up the register, which was one of the main 
reasons why the CORE project was cancelled.
Organisational reform
6.30  Is there still a case for having local EROs 
responsible for the electoral registers in 
their area? Or is there a case for transferring 
responsibility to the Electoral Commission?  
Research shows considerable value in having 
local officials in control of the registers. They 
have local knowledge of buildings, properties 
and local cultural/socio-economic factors 
that puts them well positioned to undertake 
the canvass and maintain the register (James 
2017). Responses to interviews were also 
broadly supportive of local officials retaining 
control of their registers.
 •  Recommendation #9: Local EROs should 
continue to be the main custodians of 
the electoral register in the geographical 
area, with support from the Electoral 
Commission.
Summary
6.29  The decision as to whether to make 
voter registration compulsory or not is a 
philosophical one. A philosophical objection 
to AVR is that individuals have a right not 
to be registered. Democratic theorists have 
argued, however, that measures are needed 
to create a level playing field at an election.  
There are also privacy and other issues raised 
by AVR, which reinforces the need for the 
register not to be publicly available for sale.  
1 sub
There are multiple options 
for building automatic and/
or assisted voter registration 
into our democracy.
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7.1  The report has so far identified problems 
with the existing voter registration system, 
the normative case for reform and experience 
from overseas. But is AVR actually achievable 
in the UK? What options are there?  What 
might the consequences be, beyond the 
completeness and accuracy of the register? 
Five overlapping options are posed here.
Approach #1: A civil population register 
7.2  AVR is used in many countries because 
they have population registers. Electoral 
registers are simply then constructed from 
a transfer of data from that registry ahead 
of the election. Citizens and political parties 
are then usually given an opportunity to 
check the register ahead of election day. The 
construction of a new population register 
would certainly simplify voter registration in 
the UK, could make it less resource intensive, 
and easier for the citizen to understand. Luke 
Butcher from the South Korean National 
Electoral Commission told us that:
  ‘In my view automatic voter registration is going 
to require the UK to have a computerized civic 
register with ID cards. Until this happens, I am 
not sure there will be anyway to do automatic 
registration effectively.’
7.3  The Labour government passed the Identity 
Cards Act 2006, with Charles Clarke as Home 
Secretary, that would establish a National 
Identity Register (NIR) and a national identity 
card. ID cards were seen as a way to reduce 
crime and track people coming in and out of 
the country (Labour Party 2005).
7.4  This was subsequently repealed by the 
Conservative-Liberal Coalition government 
in the Identity Documents Act 2010. Theresa 
May, as Home Secretary introduced the Bill 
arguing that: 
  ‘The national identity card scheme represents 
the worst of government. It is intrusive and 
bullying, ineffective and expensive. It is an 
assault on individual liberty which does not 
promise a greater good’ (May 2010).
7.5  Conservative MP Jacob Rees-Mogg was 
quoted as saying that: 
  ‘ID cards change the relationship between the 
individual and the state. We have a right to go 
about our business and not be stopped and 
asked where we are going. If you have ID cards 
a policeman can ask you at any time who you 
are and what you are doing’ (The Week 2018).
7.6  Civil rights campaigners claimed that they 
involved an encroachment of civil liberties, 
helping usher in a ‘your papers please’ culture 
where people have to ‘prove’ their entitlement 
to what should be available to all without 
question. It is easy, by this argument, for people 
to feel excluded through the enforcement 
mechanisms that require ‘proof’. If ID cards 
are not to be a restriction on freedom, the 
functions to which they may be put should be 
very tightly limited, not just at inception but 
as time passes. The civil liberties argument is 
that though this is theoretically possible, in 
practice ‘mission creep’ is inevitable. At the 
very least, it needs to be guarded against very 
carefully – but in practice this argument may 
well be strong enough to mean that this kind of 
a system should be avoided.
7.7  There have been recent calls for a civil 
population register and ID cards to be 
reintroduced in the wake of the Windrush 
scandal and Brexit from the thinktank Policy 
Exchange (Goodhart and Norris 2018) and, 
former Home Secretaries Charles Clarke, Alan 
Johnson and Ken Clarke (Ferguson 2018). 
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7.8  There are no manifesto commitments 
to introduce a civil population register 
(although the Conservative government is 
committed to requiring voter ID at polling 
stations), so such a major reform would 
currently have little public mandate. It is 
likely that there would be considerable costs 
involved in setting up a new system. It is 
therefore unlikely that this policy would be 
pursuable at this time. Further, the political 
risks of mission creep might well be seen as 
growing at time of political turbulence, rising 
nationalism and related issues.
Approach #2: Use of an expanded DWP CIS database
7.9  Although there is currently no formal 
population register, the existing voter 
registration system is already contingent on 
checking applications against information in 
the DWP Customer Information System to 
verify electoral registration applications.  An 
alternative would therefore be for the DWP 
CIS system to ‘double up’ as the electoral 
register, or a central elector database could 
be created, connected to the DWP CIS.
7.10  The advantage of this is that there is already 
a unique identifier for each individual in the 
system (a NINo). The centralised nature of 
the DWP CIS would allow for duplicates to 
readily be checked. This would bring some 
significant broader organisational changes:
 •  Actively used fields for elections in the 
DWP CIS would have to be expanded 
to include nationality and eligibility for 
different types of elections.
 •  It may require greater capacity within the 
Cabinet Office, the Electoral Commission 
or a central government department to 
manage the system.
 •  An online portal through which citizens 
could check their registration status might 
be easier to implement.
 •  The system could still retain EROs as 
the custodians of their register for their 
geographical jurisdictions.
This would clearly, however, be a major reform that 
would take long-term planning beyond the current 
Parliament.
 •  Recommendation #10: The establishment 
of a central electoral register based on the 
DWP CIS is explored in the long-term.
Approach #3: Data-mining 
7.11  A third option for introducing AVR would be 
to maintain the existing localised system of 
voter registration, but allow for additional 
data sources to be made available for EROs, 
which they could then use to automatically 
register citizens. EROs could be given the 
opportunity to match various datasets and 
have the capacity to add names to the 
electoral register, if they are missing. This 
was proposed in the Local Government and 
Elections (Wales) Bill 2019.
7.12  EROs already have access to a range of local 
datasources, however. The extent to which they 
use these varies and is contingent on resources 
and personnel (Clark 2014, 2015).  The use of 
performance standards has previously been 
used to incentivise EROs to undertake data 
matching. Research has found that publishing 
information about whether EROs undertake 
activities, including using local data sources, 
encourages compliances because of fears of 
reputational damage to individual members 
of staff or local organisations (James 2013). 
Performance standards could again be used 
to incentivise EROs to data mine and register 
citizens automatically.
7.13  It is questionable whether data-mining is 
effective, however. Data-mining pilots have 
already been undertaken by the Cabinet Office 
in collaboration with the Electoral Commission 
and EROs as part of the preparatory work to 
introduce IER. ‘Data mining’ in this context 
meant ‘exploring the extent to which access to 
information held on national public databases 
can assist Electoral Registration Officers 
(EROs)’ (Electoral Commission 2013, 1). The 
conclusion of those pilots was that:  
  ‘The amount of time and resources they 
spent on reducing the data provided to a list 
of likely new electors with usable address 
information was unsustainable and could not 
be incorporated into their ‘business as usual’ 
processes’ (Electoral Commission 2013, 3).  
7.14  A Cabinet Office evaluation also flagged 
concerns about the data quality in other 
datasets. Duplicate entries, inaccurate 
addresses, ineligible electors and other issues 
made data matching difficult to proceed with 
(HM Government 2013). 
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7.15  This system could be relatively quickly 
implemented. A system that was reliant on 
EROs having sufficient time and resource 
to check other data sources, given that they 
already lack the time and resources to fully 
utilise local data sources, may not be the best 
way forward, however.  
Approach #4: Direct Enrolments for Specific 
Under-Registered Groups 
7.16  A fourth approach for introducing AVR, which 
would also maintain the existing localised 
system of voter registration, would be for 
direct enrolment to be organised for specific 
groups when they undertake new transactions 
with government services. For example, if you 
were to apply for a driving licence or state 
benefit, then EROs could be alerted to the 
new transaction at the point of time at which 
it occurred. The advantage of focussing on 
new transactions is that each transaction is 
likely to represent a more up-to-date set of 
information than is held by the ERO. 
7.17  Information from new transactions could be 
passed along the IER Gateway to EROs. It 
would then be received by electoral officials 
in their Electoral Management System, in the 
same way that voter registration applications 
are received. The applications could then be 
processed using the usual procedure (see 
Chapter 3 above). The Electoral Commission 
(2019d, 1) has already established that:
  ‘[T]echnology already employed by the 
Individual Electoral Registration (IER) Digital 
Service could form the building blocks for 
further reform. Further development of the 
IER Digital Service could see it acting as a 
conduit, receiving transactional data from 
new and reliable national data sources.’
7.18  This system would involve less radical change 
and could be targeted at particular groups 
where registration rates are low. It would 
follow on from the success of international 
experiences noted in Chapter 5.
 •  Recommendation #11: Direct enrolment 
for specific under-registered groups when 
they undertake new transactions with 
other government services 
Approach #5: Assisted Voter Registration
7.18  A final approach would be that citizens were 
simply prompted to register to vote when 
they accessed other government services.  
Registration is only automatic when citizens 
opt-in for their details to also be sent to 
EROs. This is described as ‘assisted voter 
registration’ in this report. The advantage 
of this approach is that citizens still retain 
control over the process and their data 
will not be passed on without them being 
consciously aware that this has happened. 
A disadvantage is that citizens may still opt 
not to register via this route. If there are too 
many opportunities to register to vote in this 
way, then EROs might also be overwhelmed 
with applicants.
 •  Recommendation #12: Citizens are 
prompted to register to vote when they 
access certain government services. 
Summary
There are a variety of ways in which the principle of 
AVR could be partially or entirely introduced in the 
UK. Complete introduction would seem to require 
the move to a population register or, at least, the 
construction of a new centralised electoral register 
based on the DWP CIS. Partial implementation 
could be realised by automatically enrolling citizens 
when they complete specific transactions and this 
might be a more practical option. Assisted voter 
registration could also be realised by prompting 
citizens to register to vote when they access 
government services with ‘opt-in’ boxes.
44  |  Finding the ‘Life Moments’: New National Data Sources for Direct Enrolment
AVR could improve the completeness and 
accuracy of the electoral register through direct 
enrolment for specific groups and providing 
assisted voter registration when citizens access 
other government services.  This chapter 
identifies the new national data-sources that 
could be used, based on original figures compiled 
from Freedom of Information requests.
Criteria for data sources
8.1  There is an enormous volume of transactions 
that take place each year between citizens 
and other government bodies. The 
UK government has published a list of 
transactions for services that it provides – 
there were 776 in total – and the volume 
of such transactions per annum.23 Not all 
of these would be suitable for compiling 
the electoral register, since in many cases 
the applicant is a business, for example.  
However, there would be huge potential 
to use many of these data transactions to 
improve the completeness and accuracy of 
the electoral register.
8.2   There are some criteria that should be 
considered when identifying possible uses. 
 
 •  Selectivity. Too many data streams could 
make it difficult to manage for EROs. There 
should therefore be some selectivity – and 
certainly to begin with.
 •  Reliability. Information should be accurate 
and reliable – for example, the name and 
addresses provided should be the most 
accurate record.
 •  Completeness. The data should be 
sufficiently complete for EROs to be able 
to use to amend the electoral register or 
prompt the citizen to register to vote.  
 •  Traffic volume. Data sources should bring a 
significant volume of transactions for the 
process to be worthwhile. 
 •  Addressing gaps. A further consideration is 
that the data sources should identify those 
groups who are least likely to be on the 
electoral register with the aim of addressing 
those gaps, and not extend any existing 
disparities between groups who are missing 
from the register.
 •  Preventing new inequalities. The selection of 
data sources should not introduce any other 
new inequalities in the completeness of the 
register between groups. 
 •  Appropriateness. At some life moments it 
would not be appropriate to ask – such as 
booking prison visits (of which there were 
nearly one million transactions) because it 
could create a negative association for the 
citizen.
 •  Privacy and consent. Citizens should have 
a reasonable expectation that the relevant 
data-stream might be used for this purpose, 
and in some circumstances give consent 
to that use. Assessing that reasonable 
expectation and ensuring that any 
consent gained is informed will require an 
understanding of all the purposes to which 
the register will be put, which will be easier 
if those purposes are very strictly limited.
8.3  With the criteria of selectivity in mind, it 
makes sense to focus on new transactions 
that citizens have with governmental bodies 
rather than the repeated transactions 
that they might have since they would 
be more likely to enter fresh data, rather 
than have data roll forward. A selection of 
the government transactions is published 
in Appendix C which could meet these 
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23 https://www.gov.uk/performance/services?sortby=department_
name&sortorder=ascending.  In most cases the government data 
that it has published was from 2016/7, so new data was requested 
for this report and is published below.
24 For other suggested sources, see: https://services.parliament.uk/
Bills/2016-17/automaticelectoralregistrationschoolstudents.html
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criteria.24 The next section considers the 
advantages and disadvantages of using each 
of these data sources, informed by updated 
information about the volume of transactions 
based on Freedom of Information requests.
Issuing of National Insurance Numbers
8.4  When a Child Benefit claim is made HMRC 
allocate a Child Reference Number to 
the child. When the child approaches 16 
years old, the number is converted into a 
National Insurance number. This is known 
as a ‘juvenile registration.’ HM Customs 
and Revenue then writes to citizens, three 
months before their 16th birthday to inform 
them of their National Insurance number.  
Table 8.1 shows the number of such Juvenile 
Registrations for National Insurance numbers 
that there were for each tax year from 
2015/6 to December 2019.25
2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 April 2019 to 
December 2019
703,446 691,748 681,748 699,116 541,235
Table 8.1: Juvenile Registrations for National insurance numbers 
2015/16 to December 2019
8.5  Given that 16-year olds are able to be 
attainers or vote in many elections across the 
UK, this is a natural life moment when this 
information could be passed to EROs. The 
advantage of this data it that it would contain 
all of the necessary personal identifiers that 
EROs would need to register the citizens to 
vote. This has already been proposed by the 
APPG on Democratic Participation (Bite the 
Ballot, James, and ClearView Research 2016) 
and supported by the Electoral Commission.26
 8.6  This would be a very administratively 
efficient way of increasing voter registration 
amongst an under-registered group, who 
were negatively affected by individual 
electoral registration. It could potentially save 
money with voter outreach efforts to them.  
The success of direct enrolment in Victoria 
provides good evidence that this would be 
successful in boosting turnout in the UK.  
These young citizens could then be provided 
accompanying civic education lessons in 
schools. Matteo Bergamini of Shout Out 
UK told us that this would be an important 
accompanying reform (albeit beyond the 
scope of this report):
  Political literacy would give us, the next 
generation, a clear understanding of what 
politics is, how our society works and why 
voting is relevant and important.
 
 •  Recommendation #13: Citizens are 
automatically added to the electoral 
register when they are issued their 
National Insurance number ahead  
of their 16th birthday.
8.7  One concern that has been raised about 
recommendation 13 is that citizens can be 
registered as attainers in Scotland and Wales 
as young as 14. There are separate GDPR 
requirements for under 16s,27 but these apply 
only to consent in relation to information 
society services - effectively social media - 
rather than to the kind of data that would 
be dealt with here. The ICO’s guidance on 
’Children and the GDPR’ makes it clear 
‘As voting is a habitual 
act, in which voting and 
non-voting patterns are 
developed while young, 
it is very important for 
young people to vote at 
an early age in order to 
increase the likelihood that 
they will continue to vote 
throughout their lives.’
Taidgh Pledger – National Union for Students
25 Data and information from Freedom of Information Request FOI2020/00118
26 https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/our-views-
and-research/our-research/accuracy-and-completeness-electoral-registers/2019-
report-2018-electoral-registers-great-britain/completeness-great-britain
27 See: evidence from Dr. Andy Mycock and Toby James to the Scottish Parliament 
Finance and Constitution Committee, 11 September 2019 http://www.parliament.
scot/parliamentarybusiness/report.aspx?r=12244&mode=pdf p.35-6
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28 Freedom of Information Request FOI2020/00168
29 https://www.gov.uk/elections-in-the-uk
30 Data was obtained from https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-insurance-number-allocations-to-adult-overseas-nationals-entering-the-uk, dated accessed 5th February.
31  Source: Student Loans Company, Freedom of Information Request 20200120-01. Notes provided by the SLC:  
“[1] Study support refers to any application for any financial support, including maintenance and tuition fee loans 
[2] Postgraduate application figures are derived from accounts created within post-payment system 
[3] Method of Attendance is used to determine full-time/part-time split for postgraduate information 
[4] Application type is used to determine full-time/part-time split for undergraduate loans 
[5] FE support includes Advanced Learner Loan (England), Welsh Government Learning Grant (Wales) and Education Maintanance Allowance (Wales and Northern Ireland) products 
[6] Study level for change of address customers is determined by repayment customer type as customers could meet multiple criteria of having both undergraduate and postgraduate loans 
[7] This report covers all domiciles, however application numbers do not cover Scotland - SLC only holds application numbers for England, Wales, Northern Ireland and EU.  Address change 
notifications cover these domiciles plus Scotland. 
[8] Address update figures are drawn from post-payment system for any address changes to customers’ home address, dates refer to date of address change not date of funding 
[9] 2019/20 is not a full year - figures are subject to change as the application cycle for this academic year is still open”
that for GDPR purposes ’children’ refers to 
under 18s: the restrictions on processing 
other than in relation to information society 
services apply to all under 18s. GDPR 
problems should not arise here because the 
sharing of information would be purposive 
and limited to that which was required for 
voter registration. This is another area where 
limiting the use of the register – in particular 
to avoid commercial, marketing, profiling and 
political use – would help to make things 
clearer. 
8.9  There would be a need for EROs in Scotland 
and Wales to check these new registrations 
against attainers aged 14 and 15 to avoid 
duplicate registrations. To administratively 
simplify the process further, there would be a 
case for removing attainers from the register 
in Scotland and Wales aged 14 and 15, 
provided that a system of AVR could register 
them in time for the elections.
 •  Recommendation #14: If citizens are 
registered automatically on receipt of their 
NINo, the case for not registering them as 
attainers prior to this date is considered.
8.10  At present, when citizens are written to 
ahead of their 16th birthday with their 
National Insurance number there is no 
mention of their entitlement to register 
to vote, even though in parts of the UK 
they will have been newly enfranchised.  
Figure 8.1 is the template letter that 
citizens receive, which was provided by 
HM Revenue and Customs as a result of a 
Freedom of Information Request. Neither 
are there any accompanying leaflets about 
voter registration.28 In advance of any direct 
enrolment for citizens, this letter could be 
altered to notify citizens living in Scotland 
and Wales how to register to vote.  
 •  Recommendation #15: Letters to citizens in 
Scotland and Wales notifying them of their 
National Insurance number ahead of their 
16th birthday should include information 
about voter registration.
Figure 8.1 Template letter received by HMRC
8.11  New National Insurance numbers are also 
issued to citizens at other points. Should 
a citizen move to the UK from many other 
countries then they would be entitled to vote 
in elections.29 They would often then apply 
for a National Insurance number in order to 
work. These applications are processed by 
the DWP rather than HM Treasury.
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8.12  Data from the DWP shows that there were 
0.75 million such new numbers issued to 
adult overseas nationals in the year up to 
September 2019.30 Irish and qualifying 
Commonwealth citizens are entitled to vote 
at all elections and should therefore appear 
on both Parliamentary and local government 
registers.  EU citizens (except Ireland, Malta 
and Cyprus) can vote at all other elections 
and should therefore appear on the local 
government register. Using government 
data, we estimate that there would have 
been 169,354 citizens who could have been 
added to the parliamentary register in 2019 
and 436,263 who would have been added 
to the local government register. Given that 
registration rates are 62% for Commonwealth 
citizens and 54% for EU citizens, a huge 
proportion of these eligible citizens are 
likely to be missing from the register. We 
would estimate that direct enrolment would 
therefore have increased the completeness of 
the parliamentary register by 65,000 names 
and the local government register by 188,000 
names. The highest nationality groups of 
these electors is detailed in Table 8.2.
Potential local government 
register entries
Potential parliamentary 
register entries
India 72,330 India 72,330
Italy 51,694 Pakistan 18,486
Poland 42,906 Nigeria 12,669
Spain 37,045 Australia 11,667
Portugal 23,570 Ireland 11,040
Table 8.2: Estimated new entries to the electoral register from new 
adult NINos, by highest nationality
 
 •  Recommendation #16: Adult citizens 
are automatically added to the electoral 
register when they apply or are issued a 
new NINo. 
Student Loans Company
8.13  The Student Loans Company (SSLC) also 
administers a considerable number of 
transactions from one of the most under-
registered groups, students/recent graduates, 
making it a potentially very useful source. 
Table 8.3 provides data on the volume of 
student loan applications, while Table 8.4 
provides data on the volume of change of 
address notifications.31 EROs could therefore 
be notified when the Student Loans Company 
receives a new application for study support 
or a change of address. In order to prevent 
an overwhelming volume of information 
being sent to EROs, which most likely will not 
involve a change of address, the SSLC could 
instead provide an ‘opt-in’ box for students.  
Information could then be sent on where 
students request the SSLC to do so. It could 
be automatically sent where the SSLC are 
notified of a change of address. 
 •  Recommendation #17: Citizens should 
be able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register 
to vote when they make a new Student 
Loan application from the Student Loans 
Company or make any changes of address.
University registration
8.14  In 2017/18 there were 2.34 million students 
at UK higher education institutions (Bolton 
2019, 14). Although not all of these would 
be eligible to vote at all elections, measures 
to enrol students could significantly boost 
voter registration rates. The All Party 
Parliamentary Group on Democratic 
Participation previously recommended that 
university, further education and higher 
education students are prompted to register 
to vote when they annually enrol on their 
Academic 
Year
Full-time 
undergraduate 
support
Full-time 
postgraduate 
support
Part-time 
undergraduate 
support
Part-time 
postgraduate 
support
FE 
financial 
support
2015/16 1,489,488 N/A 131,981 N/A 225,500
2016/17 1,487,800 51,351 127,308 18,982 234,297
2017/18 1,529,059 60,947 135,824 35,369 208,124
2018/19 1,531,093 64,790 157,342 37,802 194,714
2019/20 1,487,823 5,161 148,756 20,416 136,818
Table 8.3: Student Loan and Further Education applications
Academic 
Year
Undergraduate Postgraduate
2015/16 805,976 0
2016/17 928,673 9,145
2017/18 1,043,065 11,025
2018/19 1,112,624 15,370
2019/20 533,046 10,065
Table 8.4: Change of address notifications for 
student loans
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course (Bite the Ballot, James, and ClearView 
Research 2016, 10). Students are required 
to re-register each year and this provides an 
excellent opportunity to capture their new 
address. If voter registration information is 
built into these forms, then it could be passed 
on to EROs directly.  
8.15  Sheffield City Council Electoral Services 
worked with Sheffield University to give 
students the chance to register to vote during 
their annual university enrolment process. 
This has been widely flagged as best practice 
because an estimated 75 per cent and 76 per 
cent of students were enrolled in the first and 
second year of the scheme. This compares 
to rates as low as 13 per cent for other 
universities.32
8.16  The Higher Education Act 2017 requires 
universities in England to undertake any 
steps that the Office for Students (OfS) sets 
out to help register students. The directions 
the OfS can give are set by the Minister of 
State, who acts as a gatekeeper. In February 
2018, the Secretary of State for Education set 
out guidance and the OfS then published the 
Regulatory Framework for Higher Education 
in England, which lays out its approach to 
managing electoral registration in condition 
E5. A provider will be expected to:
 •  provide information to an electoral 
registration officer when asked to do so
 •  facilitate cooperation and an effective 
partnership with the electoral registration 
officer
 •  provide its students with easily accessible 
information about how to register to vote
8.17  There is therefore no provision for AVR, but 
EROs are now provided with information on 
students that they could use as a local data 
source to improve the completeness and 
accuracy of the register. Careful evaluation 
of the scheme will be required to ascertain 
whether the scheme is sufficiently directional 
to lead to widespread adoption of evidence-
based best practice. Some flexibility is helpful 
for universities and electoral administrators, 
they have argued, because universities and 
student populations can cut across the 
jurisdictions of different EROs, especially 
in London, which makes some activities, 
such as data sharing, complicated. But with 
many other pressures facing university 
administrations, voter registration is not likely 
to be given much priority and resources.33 
However, there is also clearly further scope 
to explore registering students by building it 
into student enrolment. Taidgh Pledger from 
the National Union of Students told us that:
  ‘Ever since legislation was first drafted for the 
move to IER in 2011 NUS has campaigned 
for the integration of voter registration into 
student enrolment processes. NUS would 
favour a mandatory scheme, whereby 
ERO funds were utilised to ensure that all 
universities and colleges had the capacity to 
integrate voter registration with enrolment.’
  The National Union of Students also 
informed us that many universities were not 
providing EROs with information about their 
students for them to enrol because they were 
concerned about data protection issues:
  Although several universities have found 
an approach for mass data sharing with 
which they felt comfortable, the majority of 
institutions have not gone down this route 
because of data protection concerns. This is 
despite assurances that we received from the 
Cabinet Office that this need not in any way 
act as a barrier, and that all data protection 
issues can be overcome. The government 
should provide better information to 
institutions of their responsibilities around 
data protection so that they can be clear that 
automatic voter registration schemes would 
not impinge upon this.  
  
 •  Recommendation #18: Universities are 
stringently monitored to ensure that 
they are meeting guidance and sanctions 
are enforced for failures to comply with 
guidance.
 •  Recommendation #19: Universities should 
be required to build voter registration 
practices into their annual student 
enrolment processes. 
Passports
8.18  The Passport Office is in receipt of a large 
volume of applications for new passports 
each year. In 2016, this included 6.49 million 
applications from UK applicants and 0.44 
million international applications for UK 
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There is further scope 
to explore registering 
students by building it 
into student enrolment
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passports. No breakdown is recorded by the 
Home Office of the age of the applicants 34 
so it is unclear whether these are a notably 
under-registered group. However, the 
information taken from the citizen at this 
moment in time is likely to be complete and 
accurate. It would therefore be helpful for the 
citizen to be prompted to register to vote.
8.19  The Home Office also receives a much 
smaller volume (0.14 million in 2016) of 
applications for UK citizenship. This is a 
notable life moment in which a citizen’s 
eligibility to vote may change. Given the 
relatively small volume of applications, this 
information is likely to be useful for EROs 
and should be made available.
 •  Recommendation #20: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they apply for a passport  
and/or a change in citizenship status.
DVLA
8.20  The DVLA receives many applications for driving 
licences each year, but other transactions 
include change of address, driving licence 
renewals and vehicle tax renewals. Table 8.5 
provides data from 2016 to 2019 on the 
volume of such applications.35 Citizens could be 
prompted to register to vote at these moments. 
Provisional driving licence applicants are likely to 
be younger citizens which would make that data 
stream highly useful for EROs. There is a legal 
requirement for citizens to change the address 
on their driving licence when they move, so this 
information should be highly reliable. Vehicle tax 
renewals are much larger in number – but this is 
a renewal and there is a risk that the volume of 
transactions would be overwhelming for EROs 
without thorough piloting. This source would 
therefore best be discarded.
 •  Recommendation #21: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they apply for a full/provisional 
driving licences and notify the DVLA of a 
change of address.
Disability benefits
8.21  Personal Independent Payment is provided 
to citizens who have a health condition or 
disability. It replaces the Disability Living 
Allowance.36 Data for the latter is presented 
in Table 8.6. Meanwhile Attendance 
Allowance provides for extra costs for 
citizens with disabilities that may have a 
physical or mental disability. Data for the 
latter is presented in Table 8.7.37 
8.22  Citizens with disabilities do have lower levels 
of voter registration, so both application 
systems would be reasonable opportunities 
to allow citizens to register to vote.
Year New Claims
2015 92,000
2016 95,000
2017 103,000
2018 113,000
2019 118,000
     
  Table 8.6: Volume of applications for Disability Living 
Allowance 2015-2019
Year New Claims
2015 317,000
2016 319,000
2017 307,000
2018 331,000
2019 334,000
 
  Table 8.7: Volume of applications for Attendance Allowance 
2015-2019
Provisional drivers 
licence applications
Full drivers’ licence Drivers licence 
change of address
Drivers licence 
renewals
Vehicle tax renewals
2015 Not provided Not provided Not provided Not provided 22,205,890
2016 978,790 876,195 3,982,529 954,720 20,213,054
2017 980,487 950,920 4,059,929 910,702 19,451,661
2018 980,811 880,222 3,859,968 816,068 19,465,661
2019 1,001,002 867,379 4,053,338 928,532 18,384,185
Table 8.5: Volumes of transactions with citizens undertaken by the DVLA
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and Support Allowance (ESA), income-based 
 •  Recommendation #22: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to vote 
when they submit Personal Independent 
Payment and Attendance Allowance.
Child Benefit
8.23  Child benefit can be provided to those 
responsible for bringing up a child under 16, 
or someone under 20 if they are in approved 
education or training. New applicants for child 
benefit will therefore be mostly be parents 
or guardians of younger children. Table 8.8 
shows data on new claimants from 2014/5 to 
2018/19. There are usually three-quarters of 
a million such new applicants. 
 
8.24  This would be a large volume of new 
applications for EROs to process, but citizens 
could be given the opportunity to ‘opt-in’ for 
their electoral registration details to be updated.
Year New Claims
2014/15 876,663
2015/16 875,126
2016/17 891,383
2017/18 822,353
2018/19 767,401
  Table 8.8: Volume of applications for Child Benefit 2015-201938
 •  Recommendation #23: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to vote 
when they submit new child benefit claims.
Universal Credit 
8.25  One of the major government reforms being 
rolled out is the move to Universal Credit, 
which has been phased in and is replacing 
many other state benefits.39 Data from the 
DWP in Table 8.9 below shows how there has 
been a considerable rise in applications for 
the scheme so that 2.5 million people were 
on Universal Credit by October 2019, with 
over 400,000 of those being in the 16-24 age 
range. Citizens could therefore be offered 
the opportunity to register to vote when 
they make new applications for Universal 
Credit. This information would help to boost 
registration rates amongst those in lower 
socio-economic groups, who are also more 
likely to be private renters.
 •  Recommendation #24: Citizens should 
be able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register 
to vote when they submit new claims for 
Universal Credit.
Other DWP Transactions
8.26  Some transactions are few in number but 
have a symbolic importance. The Life in the 
UK Test is a computer-based test that is 
one of the requirements for anyone seeking 
Indefinite Leave to Remain in the UK or 
naturalisation as a British citizen. The number 
of transactions is relatively small at 126,021 
in 2016/17, but given that this is a moment 
when a citizen’s status on the franchise 
Age band 16-24 25-49 50 Plus Unknown/Missing Total
October 2018 263,830 769,367 252,363 565 1,286,127
November 2018 281,343 832,555 274,656 634 1,389,187
December 2018 306,365 921,347 306,720 710 1,535,143
January 2019 317,629 974,286 325,365 764 1,618,043
February 2019 327,651 1,032,817 345,311 830 1,706,607
March 2019 343,434 1,106,116 365,902 830 1,816,280
April 2019 361,581 1,189,023 389,415 880 1,940,904
May 2019 370,636 1,248,736 405,930 948 2,026,245
June 2019 385,478 1,336,282 429,194 58 2,151,015
July 2019 399,607 1,402,462 446,932 65 2,249,063
August 2019 415,963 1,469,051 465,298 55 2,35,0373
September 2019 428,311 1,540,792 485,482 64 2,454,646
October 2019 (r) 439,146 1,604,165 503,610 54 2,546,973
Table 8.9 Volume of Universal Credit applications from October 2018-19
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might change, it would be an appropriate 
opportunity to register them to vote. An 
application for British citizenship would be 
another opportune moment with a similar 
volume of applications.
 •  Recommendation #25: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they submit claims for  
Indefinite Leave to Remain.
Tax Self Assessments
8.27  A citizen must return a tax self-assessment 
to HMRC if they have been self-employed, 
a partner in a business or in receipt of 
additional income sources. Information from 
a FOI in Table 8.10 shows that reached 12.5 
million in 2018/19.40 This is another potential 
‘life moment’ where citizens will also be 
providing all of the information that they 
would need to register to vote.
8.28  The volume of applications, however, is very 
high relative to number of likely registrants.  
These are not likely to be groups of under-
registered citizens. EROs could therefore be 
overwhelmed with the volume of information 
provided. It might still be advantageous to 
have an ‘opt-in’ button in which citizens could 
selectively have their information passed to 
EROs if they thought that they were likely to 
be incorrectly registered.
Tax Year Submissions
2014/15 11,465,000
2015/16 11,870,000
2016/17 12,177,000
2017/18 12,464,000
2018/19 12,536,000
  Table 8.10 Volume of Tax Self Assessments 2014/2015-
2018/2019
 •  Recommendation #26: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they submit their tax return.
School Information
8.29  The Automatic Electoral Registration (School 
Students) Bill was introduced into the Lords 
in June 2016 with the proposal that all 
students in schools would be registered 
automatically. The Bill specified that all EROs 
would have a responsibility to ensure that 
students aged 16 or above would be on the 
electoral register. The Secretary of State 
would be given a power to require schools to 
return information to EROs. Students would 
only be registered if they had the consent of 
the parents and schools would be required to 
confirm whether this was the case to EROs.  
The Bill did not reach second reading before 
Parliament was prorogued, but provides a 
helpful example of how automatic voter 
registration could work in schools.
8.30  There remains considerable value in this 
approach. However, if voter registration is made 
automatic for 16-year olds ahead of the issuing 
of their NINo then it would not be necessary. 
Efforts could instead focus on citizenship lessons 
Finding the ‘Life Moments’: New National Data Sources for Direct Enrolment  |  53
and students being reminded to change their 
address if they have moved. However, if direct 
enrolment at the point of issuing a NINo is not 
followed then this would be a good second 
choice option to pursue.
Devolved Administrations
8.31  A number of public services and bodies are 
under the control of the Welsh government 
and Scottish government. Transactions that 
citizens have with these services could 
therefore also be made available to EROs.  
The advantage of these sources is that they 
could be used by the devolved governments 
even if the UK government does not wish to 
pursue this approach across the whole of the 
UK. A consideration of these possible sources 
was beyond the scope of this report. 
 
8.32  It is likely that the Welsh or Scottish specific 
data is not more complete or accurate than 
the existing data already reviewed, however.  
It would be advantageous for EROs working 
in Scotland and Wales, where AVR may be 
introduced for local government registers, 
that will also be used in the devolved 
parliamentary elections, to have access to 
these national data sources.
 •  Recommendation #27: National data 
sources, such as those identified in 
recommendations 13-26 should be made 
available to EROs in Scotland and Wales, 
even if they not made available UK-wide.
Private sector sources
8.33  Private sector companies maintain a vast 
range of datasets that could be potentially 
useful for EROs. Utility companies, for 
example, would be amongst the first to be 
notified when citizens move house because 
they will need to access their broadband, 
water or electricity at the new house.  
Meanwhile credit reference agencies buy all 
electoral registers, including the full electoral 
register, thereby being better able to spot 
double registrations.
8.34  Some respondents thought that it would 
‘not be necessary’, however, to use this 
information for AVR if other public sector 
data sources were made available to EROs.  
It is also likely that citizens may feel that 
their privacy is breached if information 
about their private purchases are sent to 
governmental bodies. The possibility of 
misuse of this information and the related 
profiling information, in relation for example 
to benefits entitlement, could be significant.
8.35  There could be a statutory requirement 
for credit reference agencies to provide a 
combined version of all electoral registers, 
which the Electoral Commission could make 
available to EROs. This would be helpful to 
provide an overall analysis of the electoral 
register. There might then be scope for 
passing information onto EROs about 
duplicate registrations and possible missing 
electors.
 •  Recommendation #28: Credit reference 
agencies should be required to provide a 
copy of the combined electoral register to 
the Electoral Commission for the purposes 
of assessing and increasing the accuracy 
and completeness of the register.
Summary
In summary, AVR in the UK would require 
selectively choosing appropriate data sources 
according to criteria such as reliability, 
completeness and traffic volume. Using new 
transactions with governmental organisations 
rather than data-mining to compare databases 
would be the most efficient and effective way 
forward, as well as reducing some of the related 
privacy risks. The automatic enrolment of citizens 
when they are issued NINos ahead of their 
16th birthday could address the major under-
registration issues with young people across the 
UK. Providing opt-in opportunities to register to 
vote at other government services will also help 
EROs to maintain the electoral register to improve 
overall completeness and accuracy, without them 
being overwhelmed with data.  
1 sub
Overall, this report makes  
28 recommendations to 
modernise the UK’s electoral 
machinery for an inclusive 
twenty-first century democracy.
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This final chapter summaries the conclusions 
and recommendations.
9.1  The electoral registration system used across 
the UK was designed over a century ago, in 
a context with specific needs and challenges.  
There has been much bolt-on modernisation 
since the turn of the century with continuous 
registration, individual electoral registration 
and canvass reform being introduced at 
different times across the UK. There are major 
concerns about whether the current system 
is fit for purpose, however. This report has 
identified nine problems with the status quo:
 1.  Missing Millions: there are millions of 
eligible citizens who are incorrectly 
registered or have their names missing 
entirely from the electoral register.
 2.  Marginalised Groups: there is considerable 
inequality in voter registration rates.
 3.  Voters turned away: citizens are frequently 
unable to vote because of registration issues.
 4.  Funding crises: electoral services are 
needing to compromise on service quality 
for financial reasons.
 5.  Last-minute pressures: there are major 
surges in voter registration applications 
close to election day, which are generating 
a risk on the system.
 6.  Duplicate applications: citizens are 
attempting to register multiple times 
because of confusion.
 7.  Use of the register by credit reference 
agencies: credit reference agencies are 
paying disproportionately low fees for rich, 
publicly produced data about the process 
and their status.
 8.  The use of the edited register: information from 
the register is used in an unrestricted way, 
potentially violating the privacy of citizens.
 9.  Anonymous registration: there remains the 
need to protect vulnerable individuals from 
the publication of their data.
9.2  This report shows that AVR is the norm 
internationally in most leading democracies.  
Many Anglosphere democracies, who have 
historically not had AVR, partly because of 
their colonial legacy with the UK from which 
their system was partially derived, have 
already embarked on using direct enrolment 
for specific groups of under-registered voters.
Ensuring privacy
9.3  To make direct enrolment possible, and close 
existing loopholes with the integrity of the 
system, the report has recommended that:
 •  Recommendation #1: The fee that credit 
reference agencies pay for access to the 
full register should be increased in line 
with inflation since 2001.  The case for a 
higher fee to fund electoral registration 
modernisation should be considered. 
 
 •  Recommendation #2: The sale of electoral 
register data by credit reference agencies to 
third parties should be strictly prohibited.
 •  Recommendation #3: The Open/Edited 
electoral register should be abolished.
 •  Recommendation #4: The range of 
attesters for anonymous registration 
should be expanded to reflect victims’ lived 
experiences of abuse.
 •  Recommendation #5: Anonymous 
registration should be expanded to at least 
five years.
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 •  Recommendation #7: If automatic voter 
registration is introduced, then directly 
enrolled citizens must not have their details 
added to the open/edited register (should 
that register not be abolished).
 •  Recommendation #8: Legal restrictions 
on the use of the electoral register should 
be considered should GDPR laws change 
following Brexit.
Philosophical issues and organisational issues
9.4  The question of whether AVR should be 
introduced is a philosophical one. Concerns 
have been raised by those consider it voter 
registration should be an individual not state 
responsibility. Democratic theorists argue 
that democracy requires a level playing field 
on election day. It is important to ensure 
that there is a full and accurate electoral 
register so that some groups do not suffer 
from disproportionally low levels of voter 
registration. It is therefore recommended that:
 •  Recommendation #6: Voter registration 
should remain compulsory across the UK
 •  Recommendation #9: Local EROs should 
continue to be the main custodians of 
the electoral register in the geographical 
area, with support from the Electoral 
Commission.
Methods for introducing AVR
9.5  There are a variety of options for introducing 
AVR. One would be the introduction of a 
compulsory population register, but this 
reform would involve much wider issues 
than electoral registration so was not 
recommended. Alternatives would be: 
 •  Recommendation #10: The establishment 
of a central electoral register based on the 
DWP CIS is explored in the long-term.
9.6 More immediate reforms could include:
 •  Recommendation #11: Direct enrolment 
for specific under-registered groups when 
they undertake new transactions with other 
government services 
 •  Recommendation #12: Citizens are 
prompted to register to vote when they 
access certain government services. 
9.7  ‘Data matching’ – in which EROs compare 
the register to new national sources - is not 
likely to be a cost-efficient way forward, 
given the pressures that public services are 
under. However, there should be targeted 
interventions to register the most under-
registered groups which will have minimal 
impact on wider public services.  
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Direct enrolment to increase accuracy and 
completeness
9.8  Direct enrolment could be pursued following 
the completion of the transition to the 
reformed canvass.  The report has therefore 
recommended: 
 •  Recommendation #13: Citizens are 
automatically added to the electoral 
register when they are issued their NINo 
ahead of their 16th birthday.
 •  Recommendation #14: If citizens are 
registered automatically receipt of their 
NINo, the case for not registering them as 
attainers prior to this date is considered.
 •  Recommendation #15: Letters to citizens in 
Scotland and Wales notifying them of their 
National Insurance number ahead of their 
16th birthday should include information 
about voter registration.
 •  Recommendation #16: Adult citizens 
are automatically added to the electoral 
register when they apply or are issued a 
new NINo.
9.9  All new enrolments should be notified that 
they have had their name added to the 
electoral register at least four weeks before 
they are added. This will give them time to 
register anonymously should they need to.  
They should be excluded from the open/
edited register.  
‘Opt-in’ voter registration at other services
9.10  Citizens should be provided with an ‘opt-
in’ opportunity to directly enrol when they 
access specific other services.  The report has 
therefore recommended that:
 •  Recommendation #17: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they apply for a new Student 
Loan application from the Student Loans 
Company or make any changes of address.
 •  Recommendation #18: Universities are 
stringently monitored to ensure that 
they are meeting guidance and sanctions 
are enforced for failures to comply with 
guidance.
 •  Recommendation #19: Universities should 
be required to build voter registration 
practices into their annual student 
enrolment processes. 
 •  Recommendation #20: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they apply for a passport and or 
a change in citizenship status.
 •  Recommendation #21: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they apply for a full/provisional 
driving licences and notify the DVLA of a 
change of address.
 •  Recommendation #22: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they submit Disability Living 
Allowance and Attendance Allowance.
 •  Recommendation #23: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they submit new child benefit 
claims.
 •  Recommendation #24: Citizens should 
be able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register 
to vote when they submit new claims for 
universal credit.
 •  Recommendation #25: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they submit claims for Indefinite 
Leave to Remain.
 •  Recommendation #26: Citizens should be 
able to ‘opt-in’ and effectively register to 
vote when they submit their tax return.
 •  Recommendation #27: National data 
sources, such as those identified in 
recommendations 12-26 should be made 
available to EROs in Scotland and Wales, 
even if they not made available UK-wide.
 •  Recommendation #28: Credit reference 
agencies should be required to provide a 
copy of the combined electoral register to 
the Electoral Commission for the purposes 
of assessing and increasing the accuracy 
and completeness of the register.
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•  What are the problems with the existing system of electoral registration?
•  What alternative systems have been used overseas?  How effective have they proven?
•  What sources of data could be used for automatic voter registration? For example, information 
from other public bodies? Information from the private sector?
•  Would you have any concerns about cyber-security? If so, how could they be redressed?
•  What concerns would you have, if any, about data privacy? If so, how could it be redressed?
•  How should specific privacy concerns, for example, personal data of victims of violence and 
domestic abuse, be addressed?
•  What concerns, if any, do you have about the use of the electoral register? For example, by 
government departments or the sale of electoral register? How can they be mitigated?
•  Should voter registration be opt-in or opt-out? To what extent can consent and active citizen 
choice be achieved?
•  Any other comments.
Appendix A: Survey Questions
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The following individuals or organisations provided input into the report for which  
we are very grateful:
 • Areeq Chowdhury, WebRoots Democracy
 • Pascal Crowe, Open Rights Group 
 • Lucy Hadley, Women’s Aid
 • Jess Garland, Electoral Reform Society
 • Peter Stanyon, Association for Electoral Administrators
 • Grant Hazell, Democracy Counts
 • Dr Michael A Ward
 • Luke Butcher, National Election Commission of the Republic of Korea
 • Charlie Fisher, Teignbridge District Council 
 • Anna Last, Ipswich Borough Council
 • Lisa Vines, Lancaster City Council
 • Nicky Gilligan, East Staffordshire Borough Council
 • Steve Daynes, Braintree District Council
 • David Levine, Alliance for Securing Democracy
 • Stuart Gurthie, Norwich City Council
 • Thomas Henry, Norwich City Council
 • Jean Harrison, individual citizen
 • Tobias William Reynolds, University of Salford (student) 
 • Peter Clark
 • Stella-Maria Thomas
 • Ann Taylor, Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council
 • Matteo Bergamini, Shout Out UK
 • Ben Graham Jones, International Election Analyst and Observer
 • Dr Ian Graham, University of Edinburgh
 • Sue Rodden, Broxtowe Borough Council
 • Taidgh Pledger, National Union of Students
 • Nathaniel Reader, Victorian Electoral Commission
Appendix B: Respondents
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Life moment Organisation Annual volume of applications
Application for full-time study support Department for Education / Student Loans Company 1.92 million
Application for part-time study support Department for Education  .11 million
Student loans: voluntary repayments Department for Education / Student Loans Company .65 million
Applications for Further Education (FE) 
financial support
Department for Education / Student Loans Company .07 million
Drivers licence change of address DVLA 3.03 million
Provisional driving licence DVLA 1.12 million
Drivers licence changes DVLA 3.0 million
New Pension Credit Claims Dept for Work and Pensions 0.10 million
Disability Living Allowance: new claims Dept for Work and Pensions .18 million
State pension: new claims Dept for Work and Pensions .43 million
Income support: new claims Dept for Work and Pensions 0.24
Budgeting Loans Dept for Work and Pensions 1.43 million
Carer’s allowance: new claims Dept for Work and Pensions .28 million
Attendance allowance: new claims Dept for Work and Pensions .35 million
Jobseeker’s Allowance: new claims Dept for Work and Pensions 1.01 million
Child maintenance transactions Dept for Work and Pensions No data
Child benefit transactions HM Revenue & Customs 1.17 million
Self assessment tax submissions HM Revenue & Customs 7.04 million
Domestic applications for UK passports Home Office 6.49 million
International applications for UK passports Home Office .44 million
Home Office travel documents for non-British 
citizens
Home Office .35 million
Life in the UK Test Home Office .13
Applications for British citizenship Home Office .14
Table A1: Select new transactions with citizens, based on data for 2016-1741
Vehicle tax renewals DVLA 47.1 million
Drivers licence renewals DVLA 4.1 million
Existing Pension Credit Claims Dept for Work and Pensions 1.84 million
Disability Living Allowance: existing claims Dept for Work and Pensions 2.4 million
State pension: existing claims Dept for Work and Pensions 12.9 million
Carer’s Allowance: existing claims Dept for Work and Pensions 1.22 million
Attendance Allowance: existing claims Dept for Work and Pensions 1.59 million
Income Support: existing claims Dept for Work and Pensions .60 million
Table A2: Select renewal transactions, based on data for 2016-1742
Appendix C: Government 
Transactions with Citizens
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